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PAUL R. MCDANIEL***
The Budget Document of the United States for fiscal year 1976
issued in January 1975 contained for the first time a Special Analysis
entitled "Tax Expenditures."' This material was included pursuant to
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 2 which contains a number of
other provisions relating to "tax expenditures" as well as a definition
of that term. This Act represents the most concrete recognition taken
by any country' that tax subsidies constitute a form of government
spending and thus are essentially linked to the methods of govern-
ment spending traditionally covered in budget documents.
I. THE TAX EXPENDITURE CONCEPT IN GENERAL
Essentially, the tax expenditure concept, as applied to an income
*Some of the material in this article is based on a paper delivered by Professor
Surrey at the International Tax Conference, Nairobi, Kenya, January 1976.
**Jeremiah Smith Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
***Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
' BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1976, Special Analysis F at 101
(1975). The 1977 Budget has a similar analysis, Special Analysis F at 116 (1976), con-
taining an extended description of the tax expenditure concept and the various tax ex-
penditure items. See also the 1977 Budget, at 58, for an introductory discussion of tax
expenditures in Part 5, The Federal Program By Function, and also page 15.
Act of July 12, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 [hereinafter cited as
Budget Act].
Apparently only West Germany has recognized the propriety and utility of
quantifying tax subsidies on a systematic basis. West Germany has since 1966 published
information concerning expenditures—called "tax aids"—through its tax provisions.
The German experience is discussed in Ault, Steuervergunstigungen in der Bundesrepublik
Deutchland and den USA, 5 STEUER UND WIRTSCHAFT 335 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Ault]. A discussion of tax incentives in other nations will appear in General Report, Tax
Incentives as an Instrument for Achievement of Government Goals, Vol LXIa, CAHIERS DE
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tax, regards such a tax as composed of two distinct elements. The first
element contains the structural provisions necessary to the application
of a normal income tax, such as the definition of net income; the
specification of accounting periods; and the determination of the en-
tities subject to tax, the rate schedule and exemption levels. These
provisions compose the revenue raising aspects of the tax. The second
element consists of the special preferences found in every income tax.
These special preferences, often called tax incentives or tax subsidies,
are departures from the normal tax structure and are designed to
favor a particular industry, activity, or class of persons. They partake
of many forms, such as permanent exclusions from income, deduc-
tions, deferrals of tax liabilities, credits against tax, or special rates.
Whatever their form, these departures from the "normative" income
tax structure essentially represent government spending for the fa-
vored activities or groups made through the tax system rather than
through direct grants, loans, or other forms of government assistance.
Put differently, whenever government decides to grant monetary
assistance to an activity or group, it may elect from a wide range of
methods in delivering that assistance. A direct government grant or
subsidy may be made; a government loan may be made, perhaps at a
special interest rate; a private loan may be guaranteed by the gov-
ernment; and so on. In contrast, the government may use the income
tax system and reduce the tax otherwise applicable, by adopting a
special exclusion, deduction or the like for the favored activity or
group. Examples are investment credits, special depreciation deduc-
tions, deductions for special forms of consumption, low rates of tax
for certain activities, and so on. These tax reductions, in effect, rep-
resent monetary assistance provided by the government.
In looking at these tax preferences, one is tempted to ask such
questions as: Why have an assistance side to the tax system at all? If
we have a properly constructed revenue-raising income tax, why ask
the tax system to do anything more? Why ask it to provide assistance
to businesses or individuals or activities when we already possess a
budget process of direct expenditures for that purpose? The answers
are mixed. Depending on the particular item, they lie in both ancient
tax history and in recent events; in both a lack of realization of the as-
sistance being provided by technical tax provisions when initially
adopted and in a deliberate effort to provide assistance; in both the
inexperience and mistakes of tax technicians and in the lobbying of
strong pressure groups; in both the yielding to the demand, often
idiosyncratic, of a strong-minded influential Congressman and in the
yielding to the emotions of large congressional majorities; and, in re-
cent years, especially in 1971, to the desire of the Republican Treas-
ury Department to utilize tax incentives in contrast to the desire of
the previous Democratic Treasury to stress direct assistance programs.
DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL, International Fiscal Association (Jerusalem Congress,
1976).
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But whatever the origin of these preference items, their continued
presence today in the tax system lies in their defense by those who
benefit from their existence.
These "spending" provisions engrafted onto the normative in-
come tax have been given the name of "tax expenditures" in the
United States. The congressional recognition in the Budget Reform
Act of 1974 of this tax expenditure process has opened the way to a
study of that process and its implications both for tax policy and
budget policy.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAX EXPENDITURE CONCEPT
The legislative recognition in the Budget Reform Act of the tax
expenditure process was prompted by two developments. In 1968, the
Treasury Department published the first "tax expenditure budget."4
That Department in the 1960's had taken a general position against
the use of tax incentives to advance acceptable social policy goals,
and had instead urged the use of direct programs to provide the
needed assistance. Its study of tax incentives disclosed that nowhere in
government was there any comprehensive analysis of the existing tax
incentives or of the amounts they involved. As a result, the Treasury
undertook that analysis and drew up a list of tax expenditures to-
gether with an estimate of the revenue lost—i.e., the amount
spent—for each item. The list was arranged in accordance with direct
budget categories and a comparison made between direct programs
and tax expenditure programs.5 Similar lists were published in later
years, principally by the tax staff of the Congress pursuant to a legis-
lative direction in 1971." Although the Treasury had shifted its posi-
tion and ultimately disfavored the use of tax expenditure analysis, tax
reform studies began to focus on the concept.7 All this represented
one strand of the tax expenditure concept, having its roots in an
analysis of the tax structure and a comparison of the tax incentives
with direct assistance.
The second strand grew out of the considerations involved in
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.8 At various times, the Con-
gress had had serious disagreements with different Presidents with
4 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON THE STATE OF THE
FINANCES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1968, 326-40 [hereinafter cited as 1968 ANNUAL REPORT].
Id:
6 CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE REVENUE ACT OF 1971, H.R. REP. No. 708, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1971). For comparative purposes, the tax expenditure budgets for
fiscal years 1968-1976 have been compiled in 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL &
H. Auur, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 242-45(972), and 1975 Supplement 101-05
(1975).
• The tax expenditure concept and its uses were most fully developed in S.
SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973) [hereinafter cited as SURREY]. For a brief
general statement see Surrey, The Sheltered Life, N.Y. Times, April 13, 1975, Magazine
at 50.
Act of July 12, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297.
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regard to the appropriate level of government spending.° These dis-
agreements intensified in 1972 and 1973.' 0 As these disputes de-
veloped, however, it became clearly evident that the Congress itself
possessed no mechanism to shape its own overall view of government
spending. Instead, it would pass a series of separate budgets for the
various government departments without any specific overall target in
mind. Further, the level of spending was not directly coordinated with
the revenue figures, since different committees handled these items
and there was no coordinating mechanism between them.
As a consequence of these experiences, Congress in 1974 de-
veloped a procedure designed to give overall direction to its budget-
ary actions and to directly relate those actions to its revenue decisions.
In the process of designing that procedure, the legislators came to
recognize the relationship between control of government spending
and tax expenditures." For example, if an overall figure is established
for direct programs in the education or housing fields, those advocat-
ing more government aid in those fields would thus be blocked from
obtaining direct assistance. These advocates could, however, turn to
the tax committees and seek the same amount of assistance through
special deductions for education or housing. If the tax committees
adopted these tax expenditures, the control over direct spending
would clearly be undercut. In effect, two spending processes existed
in the Congress: one using traditional appropriations through au-
thorizations initiated by the legislative committees and consequent ap-
propriations initiated by the appropriations committees; the other
using the tax system and reductions in tax liabilities initiated by the
tax committees. In recognition of this duality, the Congress included
in the Budget Reform Act of 1974 a number of provisions designed
to identify existing and new tax expenditures and to coordinate the
tax expenditure route with the direct spending route.
III. DEFINITION OF TAX EXPENDITURE
The identification in the Budget Reform Act of tax expenditures
and their relationship to the budget process required a definition of
9 For example, the Congress in the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of
1968, Act of June 28, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, 82 Stat. 251, imposed an overall spend-
ing ceiling because of its concern that federal expenditures, fueled by the Viet Nam
War, were not being kept under adequate control by President Johnson. Id. 202, 203.
Ste, e.g., Hearings on President's 1967 Tax Proposals Before the House Ways and Means Comm.,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-217 (1967).
10 The disagreements had by this time also expanded to include congressional
dissatisfaction with the refusal of President Nixon to expend funds appropriated by
Congress. For an historian's view of the "Impoundment" dispute, see A. SCHESLINGER,
JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 397 (1973).
" See Panel Discussions (Discussion on the Budgetary Process) Committee Organization in
the House, Howe Select Comm. on Committees, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1973) (statement of
Stanley S. Surrey).
682
TAX EXPENDITURES
the term "tax expenditure." The Act provides the following defini-
tion:
Those revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Fed-
eral tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or
deduction from gross income or which provide a special
credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liabil-
ity...."
The legislative history of the Act indicates that the quality of "special"
relates to a "deviation from the normal tax structure for individuals
and corporations."" The legislative history also indicates that in using
the term "tax expenditures," Congress had in mind the type of items
included in the lists previously drawn up by the Treasury Department
and the congressional tax staffs." In turn, the origin of the basic
Treasury Department list shows that the list was derived from care-
fully considered criteria. As a guide, the process of identifying tax ex-
penditures began with "widely accepted definitions of income," 15 here
having in mind the general economic definition of income, i.e.,
increase in net economic wealth between two points of time plus con-
sumption during that period. However, the Treasury tempered that
criterion by also referring to the "generally accepted structure of an
income tax."" Thus, it excluded as tax expenditures unrealized ap-
preciation in asset values and imputed income from houses or other
assets, since in the United States, and largely elsewhere, these items
are not commonly regarded as income for tax purposes, though they
fall within the economic definition of income. As another criterion,
the Treasury referred to widely accepted "standards of business ac-
counting" used to determine income for financial reports." With re-
gard to expenses, it followed the economists' approach and considered
as tax expenditures those provisions allowing deductions for personal
consumption items or other items not incurred in the earning or pro-
duction of income."
Essentially, the concept of a normal (or normative) income tax
structure was one of applying a rate schedule against the taxable
unit's net income base—ascertained by including all items of gross in-
come and deducting all expenditures associated with the production
" Budget Act, supra note 2, 3(a)(3).
"The quoted language is from the Senate version of the Act. S. 1541, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1974). Although this language was not included in the definition
ultimately contained in the Act, the Conference Committee Report explained: "The
Senate definition of 'tax expenditures' has been simplified although no change in mean-
ing is intended." H.R. REP. No. 1101, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1974).
"E.g., 120 CONG. REC S. 4107-14 (daily ed. March 21, 1974) (statement of
Senator ,Davits); 120. CONG. REC. S. 4317 (daily ed. March 22, 1974) (statement of
Senator Muskie). See note 6 supra for prior lists.
" 1968 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 327.
' 6 /d.
"
"Id. at 327-28.
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of that income, with capital expenditures allocated over time in accor-
dance with generally accepted accounting practices—less personal ex-
emptions. Departures from that norm—"special" provisions—were tax
expenditures. 19
 The analysis extended to both the corporation income
tax and the individual income tax, with the present separation of the
two taxes accepted as a permissible facet of the normative structure in
the United States. 2 ° The analysis also accepts the present approach of
basing the definition of income and related computations on nominal
amounts, that is constant dollars—and thus disregards the effect of
inflation. This present approach does involve a choice as to the basic
character of the income tax in this regard. A country could choose to
base its income tax on real values and real dollars and hence adjust its
definition of income and computations for inflation. Such a decision,
however, should be a clean one. Thus, an approach that would adjust
the cost of an asset for inflation in computing gain or depreciation
but fail to make an adjustment for the decline in the real cost of
funds borrowed to buy that asset would be effecting only a partial or
preferential change to reflect inflation and would thus involve a tax
expenditure. 21
The enumeration of tax expenditures—the tax expenditure
budget—like any budget enumeration is not concerned with the wis-
See it at 327, 329-30; SURREY, supra note 7, at 4, 15 el seq. However, minor de-
partures from the norm were disregarded to avoid too cumbersome a list. The
economic definition is that developed in H. SIMONS. PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50
(1938).
The description of tax expenditures in the 1976 Special Analysis F, supra note
speaks in terms of whatever tax rates or exemption levels may exist from time to time
as the "normal" rates or levels. Id. at 102. This view is not necessarily required. All that
need be said is that a normal or normative income tax would of course contain rate
schedules and exemption levels. Since these matters are politically determined and must
essentially vary from country to country and from time to time, any particular set of
rates or levels cannot be said, and need not be said, to be "normal." Such aspects, like
the unit of taxation and the separation of the corporation and individual income taxes,
in this sense, lie outside tax expenditure analysis. See also STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES, PREPARED FOR THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS AND THE COMMITTEE
ON FINANCE 4 (Comm. Print March 15, 1976) [hereinafter cited as ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES], stating that items such as the rate schedules and personal
exemptions are not a part of tax expenditure analysis.
" For a discussion of the competing considerations involved in employing a dual
versus an integrated individual-corporate income tax structure see National Tax
Association—Tax Institute of America Symposium, The Taxation of Income from Corporate
Shareholding, 28 NAT'L TAXI 257 (1975).
II For discussions of indexing the definition of both individual and business in-
come for inflation, and the related aspect of restating financial statements, see the
forthcoming Brookings Institution volume on this subject.
The tax expenditure list does not include the last-in, first-out inventory method
since that method has been a long-recognized acceptable method of inventory account-
ing and since its use for tax purposes is conditioned on its being used for book pur-
poses. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 472(c).
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dom of the items included. Rather, the goal is simply the identifica-
tion and quantification of the tax expenditure items, and the illustra-
tion of their relationship to the items and classifications of the direct
budget." As a whole, given the concept of a tax expenditure, there is
not much dispute over the composition of the current list being used
by the Congress.23 Usually an examination of the defense made for a
" There appears in some quarters to be misconception regarding the significance
to be attached to the presence of an item in the tax expenditure list. Some assume that
this listing is an automatic statement that the tax expenditure is bad per se and a
"loophole" in the popular usage. The listing, however, is not pejorative, but only de-
scriptive of the included items as "spending" and not "taxing" provisions. The spending
programs embodied in the listing may be helpful or harmful, necessary or unneces-
sary. The answers to these queries, however, lie not in the listing but in a careful
analysis of the programs represented in the items listed. This is of course equally the
situation for each item listed in the direct budget.
Another misconception regarding tax expenditures is the view that those who
utilize the tax expenditure concept are implying, through the very listing'of these vari-
ous items, that the items should simply be eliminated from the tax system and that all
else should remain the same. Clearly this is a misconception and quite foreign to a sen-
sible approach to the tax expenditure concept. As stated in the text, the listing does not
inform us as to whether the spending involved in an item is useful. In many cases it is
not. In other cases, if spending through the income tax system were dropped it would
be necessary or appropriate either to add the increased revenues to existing direct
programs or to substitute a direct spending program (though not necessarily in the
same amount or with the same design). Moreover, while a critical examination of the
tax expenditure list could well result in the elimination of some items and a reduction
of the amount involved in others, it does not follow that the remaining tax structure
would remain unaltered. On the contrary, any significant increases in revenue resulting
from changes in tax expenditures could be applied to alterations in the tax rate or ex-
emption structure. Moreover, since a large number of the tax expenditure items pro-
vide incentives to savings and investment, many might urge that a general lowering of
tax rates, with a goal of encouraging savings and investment through that course,
should complement the elimination of tax expenditure incentives. Of course others
might prefer using the funds so freed to increase or add direct budget programs. The
point is, contrary to the misconceptions, that answers to these questions do not flow au-
tomatically from the step of utilizing the tax expenditure concept and list of tax expen-
ditures.
23 Critics of the tax expenditure approach often appear to proceed from the
premise that the list is some sort of indiscriminate or haphazard listing of tax provi-
sions, or else state that the term "special" in the Budget Act .definition can have no
helpful meaning in itself. See, e.g., MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY, WHAT You GET
To KEEP MAY BE A "TAX EXPENDITURE," (December 1975) (Morgan Guaranty Survey),
where the author styles the tax expenditure concept as a "semantic ploy," states, in ef-
fect, that the listing is "capricious and arbitrary," and then advances the observation
that "the very concept of a tax expenditure remains fuzzy—and debatable." Id. at 9, 10.
(Is it possible the writer of the piece desires to "fuzz" up the topic?) Such unsupported
statements neglect the careful analysis that was used in the original approach
and in the subsequent examinations of the list since 1968. Considering the various gov-
ernmental units and persons who have worked in the area since 1968, the differences
over the composition of the lists are indeed few. There can always be borderline ques-
tions but the clear items presenting no conceptual issue far outweigh the borderline
questions that may arise and require further analysis.
Professor Carl Shoup, in Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform, A Review Article, 30 J.
FIN. 1329 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Shoup], though he cautiously concludes that a
valid tax expenditure list can be drawn, seems to struggle with the problems he believes
are raised in Professor Bittker's approach to tax expenditures through the path of a
685
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particular provision discloses whether its supporters are treating it as
a tax incentive and are arguing in those terms, or instead are really
urging that the provision is needed to overcome a structural distortion
in the proper tax structure that would otherwise exist." The list used
in the President's 1976 and 1977 Budgets does omit a few items which
had appeared on previous lists and which appear on the present con-
gressional list, but that omission is largely due to an overemphasis on
certain policy positions of the current Treasury Department that im-
peded coherent analysis. 25
comprehensive income tax. See, e.g., Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the
National Budget, 22 NATL TAX J. 244 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Bittkerl. However, like
Professor Bittker's discussion, though considerably less so, Shoup's discussion doei not
separate the areas with which tax expenditure analysis is involved from the areas which
lie outside that analysis, such as general rate schedules, personal exemption levels, de-
termination of the taxable unit, and the relationship of the corporation tax to the indi-
vidual tax. Once that separation is perceived, then a view that sees the tax landscape as
one vast panorama without any distinctions is not relevant.
As another aspect of classification, Professor William Andrews, while accepting
the validity of the tax expenditure concept, has demurred to inclusion in the list of the
deductions for charitable contributions and medical expenses. See INT. REV. CODE OF
1954 $§ 170, 213. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV.
309 (1972). To reach this conclusion, Professor Andrews in effect converts the norma-
tive structure of the tax system from one based on the production of income to one
based on the expenditure or consumption of economic resources, excluding savings. He
then argues that in a consumption-type tax, deductions for charitable contributions and
medical expenses should not be regarded as tax expenditures. Professor Andrews' con-
clusions may be open to question even if the United States were to adopt a consump-
tion tax. However, in an income tax system, the threshold question must be whether
expenditures for charitable contributions and medical expenses are costs of producing
income. Professor Andrews does not address himself to this issue. See SURREY, SWIM
note 7, at 19-23 for further analysis of this aspect and for discussion of the "ability to
pay" justification for the medical expense deduction. Indeed, critics of the definitions
and criteria used to determine the tax expenditure list usually refer to items of medical
expenses, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213, and casualty losses, INT. REV. CODE or 1954,
I65(c)(3), as examples, and stop there, giving the impression that there are other
numerous illustrations, but really focussing exclusively on these two situations involving
loss of wealth and physical well-being.
" For example, the charitable contributions deduction was most recently
analyzed by Congress in connection with the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Act of Dec. 30,
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. One searches in vain in the hearings by the tax
committees for any argument or analysis by supporters of the deduction that charitable
contributions represent costs of producing income and hence are proper offsets to
gross income to arrive at taxable net income.
25 The 1976 Budget list (in January 1975), supra note I, omitted the exclusion of
capital gains at death, deferral of income of controlled foreign corporations, and asset
depreciation range—items which were included in previous Treasury and congressional
lists. The 1975 congressional lists included these items and also the "maximum tax on
earned income." See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE
TAXATION. ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES. PREPARED FOR THE COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS AND THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, (Comm. Print, July 8, 1975); H.R.
Km No. 145, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 53-55 (1975) (House Budget Committee). The 1975
Budget list (in January 1976), supra note I, omitted these items, but they were included
in the 1976 congressional list, which also added "cooperatives: deductibility of non-cash
patronage dividends and certain other items." See ESTIMATES of FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES,surra note 19. See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE. FIVE YEAR BUDGET
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There are, of course, those who disagree with the tax expendi-
ture concept itself, essentially on the rhetorical ground that the con-
cept implicitly and erroneously asserts all income belongs of right to
the government and that what the government decides not to collect,
by exemption or otherwise, constitutes a subsidy. They add that while
a subsidy used to mean a government expenditure for a certain pur-
pose, it now also is said to mean a generous decision by government
not to take your money. 26
One would think it obvious, however, that a decision to employ
net income as a tax base—thus including all items of gross income
and subtracting the costs of producing that income—does not in any
way assert that all income belongs to the government. Once the tax
base is properly determined, it is then the function of the rate struc-
ture to effect an appropriate allocation of each person's income for
public needs. The tax expenditure concept does not dictate the adop-
tion of a 100% flat rate of tax on net income—the rate implicitly
necessary to support the argument advanced by the above critics of
the concept. In practical life, of course, the rates adopted are deter-
mined by a complex set of factors including revenue needs, effects on
labor and investment, political considerations, and so on.
Fortunately, practical legislators were not as bemused by form
and rhetoric and did recognize that a tax preference can constitute a
subsidy that produces monetary assistance to the same degree as the
traditional direct subsidy. Others have difficulty in visualizing any
such concept as a normative income tax structure and instead see the
income tax as only the composite or jumble of statutory provisions re-
sulting from numerous ad hoc legislative decisions." Such an anar-
chistic view of the tax structure has the consequence of making tax
PROJECTIONS, Fiscal. YEARS 1977-81, 49 et. seq. and Table 19 (January 26, 1976);
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS FOR FISCAL. YEAR 1977: A REPORT To
THE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES ON THE BUDGET 381 (March 15, 1976) (the Table at
384 is Appendix A of this article) [hereinafter cited as BUDGET OPTIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1977], The 1977 Budget Special Analysis on Tax Expenditures, supra note I,
while excluding the above items, does contain descriptive material on them including
estimates of the amounts involved and some indication the items could well have been
included in the Budget list.
For descriptive summary material on each tax expenditure, see SENATE BUDGET
COMM., TAX EXPENDITURES, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (March 17, 1976).
"See, e.g., Kristol, Taxes, Poverty and Equality, 37 TIIE PUBLIC INTEREST 3, 14
(1974), quoted in WHAT YOU GET TO KEEP MAY BE A "TAX EXPENDITURE," supra note 23,
at 9; Coheen, Is Private Philanthropy "Government Money"?, 60 UNIVERSITY: A PRINCETON
QUARTERLY 14, 16 (Spring 1974); exchange of letters of Kristol and Surrey in Letters,
N.Y. Times, June 1, 1975, Magazine, at 61-63; Will, The Non-Spending of Non-Taxes,
Wash. Post, April 22, 1976, at A-17, and letter of Senator Kennedy in response thereto,
Wash. Post, May 2, 1976.
°r This view has on occasion seemed to have been espoused by Professor Boris
Bittker, although his writings in some instances appear to accept the utility of the tax
expenditure concept. Compare Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the Na-
tional Budget, 22 NATI. TAX J. 244 (1969), with,. Rinker, The Tax Expenditure Budget—A
Reply to Professors Surrey & Hellmuteh, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 538, 542 (1969).
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policy formulation a task to be performed without criteria, guidelines,
or standards, and any policy official who has tried to approach the tax
conscientiously would reject that view. Moreover, the worldwide
dialogue that continuously takes place among those who shape legisla-
tive tax developments—officials, theoreticians, tax professionals, and
taxpayers—does assume a generally understandable set of concepts
and norms representing the income tax. The speakers in that
dialogue do have understandings of a normative tax structure in their
minds, and while there may be some differences in those understand-
ings, the degree of commonness about the understandings clearly
overshadows those differences. It is that basic commonness of con-
cepts that gives the dialogue rationality and vitality. 28
IV. THE ESTIMATES OF TAX EXPENDITURES
The estimates for the amounts spent through tax expenditures
are stated in terms of the revenue losses attributable to the various
items. The procedure for making these estimates is carefully ex-
plained in the Special Analysis F of the 1976 Budget." Each item is
estimated separately by assuming that the item were deleted and all
else, including the rate schedule, remained the same. In the case of
deferrals of tax liability, the estimate is based on the current revenue
loss. Since most deferrals are likely to be lengthy or even indefinite
and in a growing economy to increase over time, and since even a
limited deferral involves a significant revenue loss (and corresponding
benefit to the taxpayer) especially at an appropriate discount rate, this
method of estimation is a reasonable approach for such deferrals.
More significantly, the estimates for the various items assume that
taxpayer behavior and general economic conditions would remain un-
changed even though the particular item—be it incentive or
subsidy—were eliminated. 30
28 Thus, the proceedings of the International Fiscal Association, the membership
of which is composed of government officials, lawyers, economists, academics, account-
ants, executives and investment advisors from many countries, reflect the generalized
acceptance of normative income tax rules. See the annual CAHIERS published by the As-
sociation. Also in the absence of such widespread agreement, the task of formulating
tax treaties between countries would be rendered virtually impossible. Tax treaties en-
tered into by the United States by and large reflect this understanding, and deviations
from the norm that are accepted by either or both of the treaty partners are generally
clearly identifiable as such.
2° See note 1 supra.
" As the discussion in the 1976 Special Analysis F, supra note I, indicates, the es-
timates show the difference between budget receipts under the current tax law and
budget receipts which would have been raised had a different tax law always been in ef-
fect. If the change in the tax expenditure involved a transitional approach to its elimi-
nation, then, as the Analysis states at 105-06, the estimate in the tax expenditure list
would show more revenue than would be obtained in the transition years.
The discussion in Special Analysis F states that tax expenditure items cannot
simply be added together for functional areas or for a grand total. The principal reason
assigned for this view is a technical one derived from the estimating process: if two tax
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Mention should be made of some comments directed to this es-
timating approach. Thus, it is said, that if a number of items were
eliminated, revenue rates generally might well be changed. This of
course may be true, but to measure the present revenue loss it is
necessary to use the present rate schedule.3' These comments focus
more sharply, however, on the second assumption—that taxpayer be-
havior or economic conditions would remain unaltered—and it is said
that this assumption is clearly erroneous and the estimates are there-
fore inaccurate because they fail to take into account taxpayer reac-
tion to changes in tax expenditures. The comments point out that the
consequently altered taxpayer behavior might lead to revenue losses
in other areas (so that no net gain might occur if the tax expenditure
were dropped) or result in such other taxpayer action as to require an
increase in direct government expenditures.32
The criticism, however, essentially overlooks the fact that all
expenditure exclusions from income were to be dropped, the combined effect would be
greater than the addition of the two separate effects since that combined effect could
push the taxpayer into a higher bracket than would a single change. Furthermore, with
respect to itemized deductions which are included as tax expenditures, the Analysis
states that the elimination of multiple tax expenditures could push taxpayers into the
standard deduction, thus limiting the resulting revenue gain. (This assumes, probably
incorrectly, that the standard deduction, which is a proxy for average itemized de-
ductions, would remain unchanged despite major changes in itemized deductions;
the low income allowance might be changed.) However, these effects of multiple
changes would not appear to be a sufficient reason for not totaling the tax expenditures
either by functional category or overall. Indeed, under the above reasons, the totals
would probably underestimate the amounts actually involved. Another reason given fir
not aggregating the estimates is that if several tax expenditures were changed the as-
sumption of no change in economic behavior or other aspects of the tax system would
have little validity. This aspect is discussed in the text of the article at notes 31-33 infra.
It should be noted that while these tax expenditures estimating considerations are also
involved in estimates of direct expenditure programs, we are accustomed to using totals
for those programs. See Bunurr OPTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1977, supra note 25, at 382,
where it was observed: "A similar measurement problem often is present with direct
outlay programs as well. For example, if veterans' college benefits were ended, outlays
would probably rise in the basic edttcational grant program."
3' See also note 22 supra.
"Graetz, Assessing the Distributional Effects 4 Income Tax Revision: Some Lessons from
Incidence Analysis, 4 J. LEGAL STUDIES 351 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Graeta appears to
take somewhat this view by stressing the importance of determining the precise
economic effects in the economy if a tax expenditure were granted or dropped, i.e.,
the ultimate consequences in terms of who benefits and who loses under the tax expen-
diture and under an elimination of that expenditure. He then describes a long trail of
taxpayer and economic reactions that must be followed in order to answer these ques-
tions. Of course, some such analysis should be made when one is considering the wis-
dom of the item—the program—involved, but one need not require such an analysis to
answer the initial question: What is the present revenue cost of the item or
program—what is the Government now spending? Whether even to determine the wis-
dom of a particular program one must indulge in the full extent of the analysis Graetz
suggests and follow his long trail is still another issue. There is some skepticism that
economists and others have the sufficient knowledge of the various possible taxpayer
behavior reactions and economic consequences to enable one to pursue that trail as far
as he would like. See also note 52 infra.
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Treasury estimates follow the approach taken in formulating the es-
timates in the tax expenditure budget. 33 This is because, as the critics
themselves acknowledge, it is very difficult to predict taxpayer reac-
tion to changes in revenue provisions. Consequently, the Treasury
and the Congress have thought it safer in most situations involving
the estimation of revenue loss or gain from a tax change to use a
"first order" estimate that is in effect a "snapshot" of the present
world with this one change made. Indeed, data regarding the di?ect
budget essentially proceed on this "first order" basis—it will be said
that $X can be saved if a direct program is dropped, with the calcula-
tion based on the present program cost and no conjecture made as to
any ripple effect in behavior if the direct program is . dropped. While
it is surely worthwhile to attempt to learn more about such "ripple ef-
fects" of taxpayer behavior incident to tax law changes, the considera-
tion of those effects is a proper subject in connection with the
analysis, in cost-benefit terms or otherwise, of the wisdom or effec-
tiveness of a particular tax expenditure. As far as the tax expenditure
estimates are concerned, however, it should be recognized that such
estimates follow the presently accepted course used by the Treasury
and Congress with regard to both revenue estimates in general, and
direct expenditure programs.
V. LIST OF TAX EXPENDITURES
The present list of tax expenditures used by the Executive
Branch and the Budget and Tax Committees of the Congress is set
forth in a Report of the Congressional Budget Office in 1976." It in-
cludes tax expenditures resulting from the Tax Reduction Act of
1975 and several other additions." Two aspects stand out at once on
33 See BUDGET OPTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1977, supra note 25.
34 BUDGET OPTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1977, sUpra note 25, at 384-87. This list is set
out in Appendix A. The differences in the Budget list and the congressional list are de-
scribed in note 25, supra. The revenue estimates in Appendix A assume that the tax
changes effected by the Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, Act of Dec. 23, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-164, 89 Stat. 970, are made permanent. The 1976 Joint Committee Staff Esti-
mates, supra note 25; assume that these tax changes are allowed to expire according to
their terms. As a result, the JCIRT staff estimates are somewhat lower than the Con-
gressional Budget Office figures for 1977-81 in several instances. The figures given in
the two estimates for the maximum tax on earned income also vary, but the difference
in this instance appears to have resulted from the different mechanical estimating pro-
cedures employed.
35 The additions are: exclusion of interest on state and local government pollu-
tion control bonds (under "Natural Resources, environment and energy") and interest
on state and local industrial development bonds (under "Commerce and transporta-
tion"), both being separated from the item exclusion of interest on general purpose
state and local bonds (under "Revenue Sharing and general purpose fiscal
assistance")—formerly all three were grouped together; the earned income credit
(1975) and the exclusion of special benefits for disabled coal miners (under "Income
Security"); the exclusion of rental value of parsonages and housing allowances of minis-
ters (now included in excluded "Meals and lodging" under "Income security"); deferral
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an examination of this list. The first is the variety of categories and
items involved. 3 ° The list is arranged by direct budget classifications
and shows that the tax expenditures approach covers nearly every
budget category in the United States. A second aspect of the list is
that the overall total is quite large—almost $106 billion for fiscal
.1977. The direct budget outlays for that fiscal year may total $419
billion. Thus, it is clear that tax expenditures are a sizeable amount in
relation to direct programs. In some budget functions, more govern-
ment funds are provided through the tax system than are spent di-
rectly, as in Commerce and Transportation (notably Housing). In
some other areas, tax expenditures constitute the largest program
under a particular function, as in Agriculture. Indeed, in the case of
Government subsidy payments, the tax expenditures or tax subsidies
far exceed the total of all direct subsidies. The $106 billion in expen-
ditures effected through the income fax system in fiscal 1977 may also
be compared to the estimated yield of the income tax—$234.5 billion
in that period. 37
VI. USES OF THE TAX EXPENDITURE CONCEPT
A. Budgetary Aspect
The recognition that government assistance is being provided
through the tax system and that the consequent tax expenditures are
a very large and important segment of government spending has
many implications. One way of putting the matter is to inquire into
of interest on U.S. savings bonds (under "Interest"); excess first-year depreciation and
expensing of construction period interest and taxes (under "Commerce and transporta-
tion"); and cooperatives (under "Agriculture"). The exemption of credit unions has
been placed under "Commerce and transportation."
The descriptive material in the 1976 Special Analysis F, supra note 1, states that
the exclusion of appreciation on assets contributed to charitable and educational or-
ganizations is included in the estimates for contributions to those organizations.
The earned income credit item in Special Analysis F, supra note I, includes only
credits offsetting tax liabilities; the refundable credits are included in direct budget out-
lays. The Congressional Budget Office list set out in Appendix A includes both aspects.
The list may contain a few significant gaps. Thus, more study should be given to
the possible existence of tax expenditures in the various accounting provisions; e.g., in-
stallment accounting and completed contract method of accounting; in the tax exempt
organization area, e.g., to what extent would income be present if these organizations
were tested by rules applicable to entities subject to income taxation; in the various
rules exempting from income tax the benefits of in-kind governmental financial assist-
ance, e.g., food stamps, rent subsidies, and the like. The Budget Analysis does discuss
in-kind governmental benefits and provides an estimate for the exclusion of food
stamps. It also discusses the tax treatment of various types of cooperatives, also giving
estimates. Cooperatives are included in the congressional list.
" There are a number of very minor tax expenditure items whose inclusion
would only obscure the research and attention that should be paid to the significant
items in the present list, or to significant items that may have been omitted. Thus, at
the present, the search need not be for a complete list covering every single tax prefer-
ence in the Internal Revenue Code.
37 BUDGET OPTIONS FOR FISCAL. YEAR 1977, supra note 25, at 14-15.
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the uses of a tax expenditure concept. In considering this matter we
may start with the budgetary aspect. Certainly a government should
know how much it is spending and for what purposes. A tax expendi-
ture budget provides this essential and elementary knowledge with re-
spect to the spending channelled through the tax system. It is interest-
ing to observe that a country that gathers as much detailed govern-
ment statistics as the United States did not have this knowledge until
1968, and that perhaps only one other country presents these data of-
ficially. In all likelihood, the data are not available in other
countries."
Once the knowledge exists, appropriate analysis becomes possi-
ble. The presence of an item in the tax expenditure table does not tell
us whether the assistance given is desirable as a national goal or not. 39
Here, as with any direct expenditure, we must weigh the particular
assistance against competing claimants, and reach a judgment based
upon our view of the national priorities involved. Even if the goal is
appropriate, the presence of an item in the tax expenditure table does
not tell us whether the particular assistance is being provided in a ra-
tional, equitable, and efficient 1. ay. Here also, just as with direct ex-
penditure items, we need to analyze the particular situation, under-
stand who is receiving what, and then weigh .the costs and benefits in
the light of the priority of the goal, and the effectiveness of the means
chosen to achieve that goal.
To do so we can ask the usual question relevant to any budget-
ary matter: Does the tax expenditure item represent a priority goal of
the government, as respects those assisted and the amount involved?
A useful, initial way to test a tax expenditure in this regard is to ask if
government would directly spend such funds for the purpose at hand.
If not, then why should the money be spent through the tax system?"
3" See note 3 supra. A great deal more information on the practice in other coun-
tries will be made available through the September, 1976 Jerusalem Congress of the In-
ternational Fiscal Association [IPA], which has chosen as one of its subjects "Tax Incen-
tives as an Instrument for Achievement of Government Coals: Their Role in Income Taxation and
a Comparison with Alternative Instruments Regarding Both Economic and Social Goals." The
General Report for that subject, supra note 3, presents a summary description of the
data on, and attitudes towards, tax incentives in about twenty countries, and the sepa-
rate National Reports provide further detail. The picture that emerges is that only the
United States and West Germany provide official data on tax expenditures. See Ault,
supra note 3. The relation of tax expenditures or tax incentives to the fiscal process is
not considered in other countries and both qualitative and quantitative data on such
items are relatively or almost absolutely non-existent. In effect, nearly every country
lacks knowledge and control regarding this significant aspect of its tax policy and
budget policy. But we must remember that the same could be said of the United States
less than ten years ago. The 1FA discussion is likely to stimulate at least academic think-
ing in some countries. Also, as the General Report describes, the OECD is beginning to
explore ways of achieving some internationally comparable data on this subject.
39 See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
9 ° For example, for a discussion of the tax expenditures for farm operations,
considered as direct farm programs, see Hearings on Tax Reform Before the House Ways
and Means Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1362 (1975) (statement of Paul R. McDaniel).
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This last question takes us to the next level of consideration. As-
suming that government assistance in the particular area is a priority
goal, then should the assistance be in the form of a direct program or
through the tax system? It is the experience in the United States that
until recently little thought was given to this aspect of the inquiry and
thus there were no criteria developed to govern the choice since no
analysis had been made of the factors involved in the choice."'
Gradually, however, various factors that are involved in a choice of
the tax system are being recognized.42 Thus, it is now realized that a
tax expenditure in the form of an exemption, exclusion, or deduction
provides the greatest assistance to the wealthiest taxpayers and to the
large corporations, in view of the progressive individual tax rates and'
dig higher rate for large as opposed to small corporations. Tax ex-
penditure assistance is usually "upside-down" assistance. Moreover,
the choice of the tax system automatically excludes from the assistance
non-taxpayers, such as individuals below taxable levels, loss pro-
grietorships and loss corporations, exempt ul gat ntatiolnr and gov-
ernmental units., This exclusion exists even where the aspect of
upside-down assistance ,ts alleviated by using a credit against tax in-
stead of an exemption or deduction.4.3
It is clear that no direct program would be structured in such an
upside-down or exclusionary fashion. Thus, in the United States the
'' The 1FA General Report, supra note 3, indicates that this question is scarcely
being asked in any other country when the tax route is used to provide government as-
sistance.
42 For a discussion of the factors involved in the choice between tax assistance
and direct assistance, see SURREY, supra note 7, at 126-74.
43 It is sometimes said that use of a tax credit mechanism avoids the upside-down
aspects of tax expenditures effected through deductions, exemptions, or exclusions.
This is not necessarily so. If the tax credit itself should be taxable, then failure to in-
clude the amount of the credit in income will mean that the credit is of greater value to
a wealthy taxpayer than it is to a lower-income taxpayer. To avoid the upside-down ef-
fect where a tax credit is employed, one must ask whether amounts paid under a direct
financial assistance program structured like the tax credit would, under normal tax
principles, be includible in gross income. If these principles would require the inclusion
of direct payments in the recipient's income, then a tax credit in the same amount
should also be treated as taxable income. Failure to do so will result in an upside-down
tax expenditure, although the range of the benefits from upper to lower income recipients
will be considerably narrower under a tax credit than under a deduction or exemption.
For example, in 1975, Congress approved changes in the child care deduction to
allow its benefits to be obtained by higher income individuals. Act of March 29, 1975,
Pub, L. No. 94-12, 1/ 206, 89 Stat, 27, 32. For a family of four (two children) with
$35,000 adjusted gross income, the benefit of this tax expenditure will be approxi-
mately $1728 (assuming marginal tax bracket of 36% titnes the maximum qualifying
child care expenditures of $4800). On the other hand, a family of four with $15,000
adjusted gross income receives a maximum benefit of only $1056 (22% times $4800).
The House Tax Reform Bill, 14.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), would have con-
verted the child care deduction to a tax credit of 20% of child care expenses up to a
maximum of $2000 of expenses for one dependent (or $4000 for 2 or more depend-
ents). The amount of the credit, however, was not required to be included in income.
(Query, does Congress have to tell the Internal Revenue Service whether each tax ex-
penditure constitutes taxable income under § 61, even though it leaves this determina-
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tax deduction for home mortgage interest means that the government
pays $700 of each $1,000 of mortgage interest for a wealthy
homeowner in the 70% bracket—and does so for his residence and
his summer vacation home and his winter vacation home—but pays
only $140 for the homeowner in the 14% bracket, and zero for the
least well-off of homeowners because they are not -taxable. This is
equally so for the property taxes on the home. Even though the en-
couragement of home ownership is presumably a priority goal in the
United States, it does not take much intuition to understand that no
direct assistance program for home ownership with this upside-down
distribution of benefits would ever be voted, and the few direct
programs we do have (though our tax program is the largest housing
program) such as mortgage interest assistance," are not upside-
down." Similarly, deferrals of tax liability gained through the expens-
Lion to the IRS in the case of direct expenditure programs?), Assuming that proper tax
principles would require a recipient of a direct governmental subsidy for child care to
include these amounts in income, failure to include the amount of the proposed child
care credit in income would provide a maximum benefit of $560 for a 70 percent bracket
taxpayer (20% x $4000 x 70%), $112 for a 14% bracket taxpayer, and zero to a poverty level
taxpayer. See general5 r, H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1975). It has been urged
that the proposed child care credit be made refundable. 122 CONG. REC. S. 3755, 3764
(daily ed. March 18, 1976) (statement of Senator Kennedy before the Senate Fin. Comm.).
The treatment of a credit under income tax principles does not necessarily re-
quire a direct inclusion in income. Thus, a direct subsidy similar to the investment cred-
it might be viewed as a contribution to capital requiring a corresponding reduction in
the basis for depreciation. Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 118, with 362(c). The tax
credit voted in the Senate January 29, 1976, 122 CONG. REC. S. 822-877 (daily ed. Jan. 29,
1976) for organizations providing child care (equal to 20% of the first $5,000 of wages paid
each welfare recipient employed in the provision of child care) if structured as direct
assistance would presumably be includible in taxable income as a direct subsidy for opera-
tions. The credit as passed by the Senate was refundable, in order to make the assistance
available to public and non-profit child care centers. See H.R. REP. No.9803, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975), as reported by the Senate Finance Committee and passed in the Senate, and S.
REP. No.592, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976): The bill was, however, vetoed by the President.
" 12 U.S.C. 17152-I (1970).
" While there are some who would quarrel with the text statement and say that
we cannot be sure that Congress would not favor upside-down direct programs, they
are not explicit in giving examples of upside-down programs they believe Congress
would approve. A group coming closest here is the Filer Commission Report, REPORT
OF 'THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS. GIVING IN AMERICA
106.14, 127-34 (1975), which offers a defense of the upside-down charitable deduc-
tion. Yet one can be skeptical that this Commission would risk a congressional vote on a
direct program allocating to individuals, on an upside-down basis, funds earmarked for
distribution by them to charitable organizations of their choice.
Some offer the defense for the upside-down aspect of tax expenditures that such
effect is merely the reflection of the progressive individual rate structure. See, e.g.,
Morgan Guaranty Survey, supra note 23, at 13: "Inescapably, of course, if Congress
wishes to achieve an economic or social goal by means of 'tax expenditure,' it must rely
most heavily on those most able to finance that goal: those with the most discretionary
funds, i.e., those in upper-income brackets." This is quite a sentence. It can either
merely be explaining the upside-down character of tax expenditures, though it neglects
to point out that the funds made available are government funds involved in the tax
•
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ing of items that are properly capital expenditures also operate in an
"upside-down" fashion, resulting in interest-free, nonsecured loans of
the deferred tax liability, with the size of the loan increasing as the
benefitted individual's or corporation's income increases. 46
 The in-
teresting, perhaps sad, fact is that until recently, legislators never re-
ally understood the implicit upside-down aspect involved in granting
assistance through the tax system by these special deductions or exclu-
sions.
The Congress has recently released tables showing the distribu-
tion of tax expenditures assistance for individuals by income classes."
Partly because of the upside-down aspect and partly because many of
the activities assisted represent expenditures or activities of the well-
to-do, e.g., capital gain transactions and exemption of state and local
bond interest, the tables show that the overwhelming amount of tax
expenditure assistance goes to upper-income groups. Thus, for 1974,
of the $58 billion in tax expenditures for individuals, over 23 percent
went to individuals with incomes over $50,000, who constituted only
1.2 percent of all taxpayers." On the other hand, the 46.9 percent of
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of less than $10,000 received
only 16.6 percent of these tax expenditures. 4 " Seen as an average, the
160,000 taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes over $100,000 received
an average of $45,662 each in tax benefits, while the approximately
9.9 million taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of between $15,000
and $20,000 received $901 each. 5 ° (Obviously, the precise assistance
for each taxpayer in the group would involve a wide range, and the
figures illustrate only the general upside-down character of the assis-
tance.) There is thus one set of generalizations that can be made
about the choice of the tax system to provide government
assistance—the assistance is likely to be provided in an upside-down
manner and to be skewed to favor those already well-off.
This discussion of the relationship of the techniques used to the
expenditure. Or it can be saying that because we have a progressive income tax it is
only right that those whopay the largest taxes should have the largest control over the
spending of government funds—a view that seems a complete non-sequitur to say the
least.
While it is not necessary at this point to maintain that no direct program would
be structured in an "upside-down" manner, it is proper to assert that those who defend
"upside-down" tax expenditures should recognize openly that the programs are indeed
"upside-down" and should be required to bear the burden of proof as to the appro-
priateness of such a result.
" See Statement of Paul R. McDaniel, supra note 40, for a description of the loan
programs for farm operations that are contained in present tax expenditure provisions.
47 See Appendix B. The table is taken from 121 CONG. REC. S. 9174-77 (daily ed.
June 2, 1975) (statement of Senator Mondale) and is bised on Treasury Department
data. Similar distributional data for each tax expenditure are contained in SENATE
BUDGF.T COMM., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM Or BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON
INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print, March 17, 1976).
"See Appendix B.
"Id.
3° Id.
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objectives sought to be achieved also points to the various ways in
which the beneficiaries of the tax expenditures may be described or
classified. At the first level, there is the overall or broad initial target
category of beneficiaries, e.g., the aged, homeowners, consumers, cer-
tain categories of employees, certain categories of investors, and so
on. The next level involves an analysis of the income groups within
this overall target category which actually benefit initially from the tax
expenditure and the extent of the benefit, i.e., the tax reduction. As a
result of the "upside-down" effect of the technique usually adopted,
the actual distribution of the tax benefits will in the main usually ac-
crue disproportionately to only a small portion of the intended ben-
eficiaries and this small group will be the persons who are already
better off and who have the least need for assistance.
A third level of description of beneficiaries would seek to dis-
cover the ultimate economic beneficiaries of the tax expenditure as its
consequences ripple throughout the economy. Tax expenditures for
home ownership will aid the construction industry; tax expenditures
for investors in residential real estate will aid the construction industry
and perhaps tenants; tax expenditures for the interest on state and
local bonds will aid state and local governments; tax expenditures for
students will aid schools; and so on. The opposite is also true, in that
the removal of the tax expenditure will have its own set of economic
effects. The construction industry may suffer; tenants may have their
rents raised; state and local governments may resort to higher taxes
on some groups; schools may lose students; and so on. Obviously this
analysis of ultimate economic beneficiaries is related to the earlier dis-
cussion of the estimates beyond "first order" estimates, 5 ' and involves
the difficult, almost endless task of tracing the effects of the tax ex-
penditure through the economy. Essentially, this task becomes an
analysis of the desirability of the tax expenditure itself—what does the
expenditure really accomplish and is the accomplishment worth the
cost in revenue and tax equity? 52
5 ' Sec discussion at note 33 supra.
" Essentially, it is this third level of description discussed in the text that is the
subject of Craetz, supra note 32. A difficulty with this analysis is that one is tempted to
push it too far, where the imponderables of the various choices available begin to defeat
an understanding of the effects of the tax expenditure or its removal. Thus, it is well
and good to point out that a wealthy investor in a state tax exempt bond may not gain
as much as one might expect from the exclusion of the interest on the bond, because, if
the exclusion were eliminated, the state, in order to meet its added interest costs, might
have to resort to taxes which might have an effect on the investor, but this needlessly
distracts attention from the very real benefits now being obtained by that investor be-
cause of the tax expenditure.
It also distracts attention from the fact that the "first order" recipients of tax ex-
penditure items extract a high commission for delivering the benefits of the tax expen-
diture to those ultimate beneficiaries whom Congress really intended to assist. These
"messengers," so to speak, who carry the tax expenditure checks to those ultimate ben-
eficiaries are well paid, which is but the mirror image of the inefficiency of tax expen-
diture assistance. See, e.g., as to tax exempt bonds, Hearings on Alternatives to Tax -Exempt
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There is another set of generalizations that can be made about
the efficiency of using the tax expenditure assistance process rather
than direct programs. Generally, and certainly until recent years,
these tax expenditures were rarely examined. They lay hidden in the
tax structure, often worded and looking like any normal structural
provision since the technical tax jargon appeared the same. Further-
more, they did not have to be voted on each year. Whatever may be
the weaknesses in our direct budget programs, they usually do have to
endure more scrutiny. Thus, the Joint Economic Committee in com-
menting in 1974 on increases in government spending said: "The
largest absolute increase has occurred in tax subsidies. Tax expendi-
tures are not included in any budget and therefore they are not re-
viewed on a systematic and regular basis."53 With the advent of the
tax expenditure budget, this absence of scrutiny may be redressed.
But the items are still in the tax laws and as such are usually perma-
nent unless changed. On the other hand—and equally irra-
tionally—the amounts involved in many tax expenditure programs
are changed, automatically and without discussion, each time Con-
gress changes rates, exemption levels, or the standard deduction.
Moreover, the "tax reform" struggles to change or remove tax expen-
diture items take place within the tax committees. These committees
are often uninformed on the real issues involved and on the other
programs that relate to the tax assistance. A look at the titles in the
tax expenditure list will reveal at once that many other congressional
committees have as their principal areas of expertise the items in that
list—housing, education, agriculture, commerce, labor, and so on.
The presence of an item in the tax expenditure budget is generally a
sign of lack of study and coordination within the executive depart-
ments and the Office of Budget and Management.
There are basic issues of efficiency and rationality in government
spending. Cost-benefit and other forms of analysis are now customar-
ily applied to direct government spending programs. They can and
should be applied equally to tax expenditure programs. If experience
in the United States is any guide, many tax expenditure programs
would be found lacking any priority status. Moreover, those that do
represent appropriate goals would be found lacking in fairness and
State & Local Bonds Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 153
(1976) (statement of Stanley S. Surrey). As to other commissions to "messengers," see
McDaniel, Tax Shelters and Tax Policy, 26 NATI. TAN J. 353 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
McDaniel) and SURREY, supra note 7, at 244. The analysis in the Graetz article, supra
'note 32, seeks to pursue the trail further, but the assumptions are likely to become too
hard to control and if pursued too far, are likely to distract us from the main effort.
It may be observed that an analysis of levels of beneficiaries similar to that in the
text should be used for direct expenditures as well, though presumably in such an
analysis there should not be a difference, as there is in the case of tax expenditures, be-
tween the category of intended beneficiaries and that of the groups within that category
caused by the "upside-down" effect of the tax technique.
53 JoINT EcoNostic COMMI1TEE, FEDERAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS. STAFF STUDY FOR
SUBCOMM. ON PRIORITIES AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974).
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efficiency. 54 Economy and efficiency in government spending would
thus be served by a careful re-examination of items in the tax expen-
diture list. 55
B. Tax Reform Aspect
1. Effective Rates Paid by United States Taxpayers
Returning to the central matter of the uses of the tax expendi-
ture concept, we may shift our attention from the budgetary aspect to
the tax reform aspect. There is considerable concern in the United
States over those well-to-do individuals and large corporations who
pay little or no income tax year after year. 56 The key to an under-
" Congress is beginning to be made aware of the fact that one useful way of un-
derstanding the effects of a tax expenditure provision is to compare it to an existing di-
rect expenditure program. For example, if one is analyzing the tax expenditures for
agriculture as government spending programs, the structure of direct spending programs
for farm operations would appear highly relevant to determining whether the tax expendi-
ture program is furthering our overall national agricultural policy. Preliminary work in this
area indicates that, in fact, tax expenditures for agriculture may be operating in a manner
that is directly counter to the objectives of direct federal financial programs for farmers. See
Statement of Paul R. McDaniel, supra note 40, at 1377-82. The task of comparing existing
direct and tax expenditure programs has only just begun, but the technique appears to offer
a fruitful method of assisting Congress in understanding and evaluating decisions to use the
tax expenditure route.
The insistence in the text of the need for examining both routes for government
assistance, the tax expenditure route and the direct route, and the belief that many tax
expenditures would come off second best in such a comparison does not, as some seem
to assert, mean that this view is but an "idealization of the appropriations process;" see
Shoup, supra note 23, at 1337, quoting Bittker, supra note 23. The belief is expressed
with the full understanding that the appropriations process is far from ideal—but cer-
tainly this does not detract from the proposition that the tax expenditure process is
even further from that ideal.
"Shoup, supra note 23, raises the interesting question of whether government
subsidies should be given to a business that is currently not operating at a profit. Ap-
parently this question has not been much discussed by economists in considering sub-
sidies. It is raised, however, by proposals to make the investment credit refundable. See,
e.g., 122 CONC. REC. S. 3765 (daily ed. March 18, 1976) (statement of Senator Kennedy).
The question is also linked to tax shelters, since tax expenditures that cannot be directly
used by a business currently not operating at a profit are made available to such busi-
ness through the tax shelter device, e.g., bank equipment leasing. See McDaniel, supra
note 52. If government assistance is to be given only to 'profit-generating enterprises,
then this factor must be injected into the criteria to be considered in choosing between
the tax route and the direct route—the issue here would be which route can more read-
ily distinguish between losing ventures and profitable ventures. Professor Shoup also
mentions the aspect of promptness of paying the government assistance, and here also
studies would be required on the promptness with which direct subsidies can be paid
compared with tax subsidies, as well as the consequences of subsequent checks, through
audits, under both routes.
S. 2925, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), would establish a so-called "zero-base" re-
view and evaluation procedure to require that all direct budget programs be examined
each four years to determine if the programs should be continued or terminated.
Senator Glenn introduced an amendment to the bill that would subject tax expenditure
programs to the same zero-base review. See 122 Coro. REC. S. 4768 (daily ed. April 1, 1976).
5° See, e.g., 121 CONC.. REC. S. 16564 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1975) (statement of
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standing of this situation is the tax expenditure list. It is this list that
explains why some of the wealthiest individuals in the United States
pay little or no income tax and why some businesses on Fortune
Magazine's list of the largest corporations also pay little corporate tax.
The list also explains why, with individual tax rates stated in the law
to rise to 70 percent, the actual rate of tax paid overall by the group
of individuals with over $100,000 income is between 30 and 40 per-
cent, with some in this group paying far less or even zero. 87 It ex-
plains why, with a corporate tax rate stated in the law to be 48 per-
cent, the average real rate is around 35 percent, with some corpora-
tions paying far less. Furthermore, the real corporate tax rate varies
erratically both among industries and within any particular industry
depending on the effects of the tax expenditure list. 88 Put another
way, this list is the key to the present income tax escape by the weal-
thy and by corporations. It is the key to why some individuals and
corporations are favored by the tax system and therefore pay far
lower taxes than others alongside them with the same income or prof-
its.
In the case of individuals, the Treasury, except for studies in
1968, has been unwilling to describe the extent of individual tax es-
cape and the causes of those escapes. Yet enough is known from the
1968 Treasury studies and from some scant data released by the tax
committees" to conclude that the causes lie in the tax incentive assis-
tance represented by items in the tax expenditure list. The special
treatment of capital gains (excluding one-half of capital gains on life-
time sales and the exclusion of all capital gains at death) is the most
significant factor, followed by the exemption of state and local bond
interest, and the use of "tax shelters."'" These "tax shelters" in turn
are built on the tax incentives granted to general business investment
and to particular industries, such as the investment credit, very accel-
erated depreciation, special five-year amortization of capital expendi-
tures in certain industries (a current favorite of the tax committees),
the expensing of certain construction costs for residential housing and
other buildings, oil depletion and the expensing of drilling costs, and
favorable farm accounting rules." Some escapes are built around the
Senator Kennedy) (as regarding wealthy individuals); 121 CONC. REC. It 9755 (daily ed.
Oct. 7, 1975) (statement of Representative Vaisik) (regarding corporations).
" J. PECHMAN Pe B. OKNER. WHO BEARS THE TAX BURDEN? 49 (1974).
"See TAX NOTES No. 46, at 26-36 (Nov. 17, 1975).
"See 121 CONG. REC. H. 79 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1975) (statement of Representative
Corman). See also Tax Shelter Investments: Analysis of 37 Individual Income Tax Re-
turns, 24 Partnership and 3 Small Business Corporation Returns. Prepared for the use
of House Comm. on Ways and Means, Sept. 3, 1975.
"See Appendix B.
"' For descriptions of the operation of the tax shelters built around these varous
tax incentives, see S. SURREY, PATHWAYS II) TAX REFORM 92 n seq. (1973); Panel Discus-
sions on the Subject of General Tax Reform Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 4-6 (1973); Hearings on the Su%.ect of Tax Reform Before the House
Ways and Means Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1360-1608 (1975); McDaniel, Tax Shelters
and Tax Policy, 26 NAIL TAX J. 353 (1973); McDaniel, Tax Reform and the Revenue Act of
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generous deductions for personal consumption expenses."
In the case of corporations, while a similar Treasury reluctance
to provide data exists, 63 a rule of the Securities and Exchange
Commission" has enabled tax reform groups to compile reasonably
accurate data concerning the effective rates paid by corporations."
1971: Lesions, Lagniappes and Lessons, 14 B.C. IND. & Comm. L. REV. 813 (1973); Kurtz,
Tax Incentives for Real Estate Have Failed, 3 REAL ESTATE REV. No. 2. at 66 (1973); H.
AARON, SHELTER AND SUBSIDIES: WHO BENEFITS FROM FEDERAL HOUSING POLICIES? (1972);
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS, A
COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS (1972-74); pamphlets on tax shelters prepared for the House
Ways and Means Committee during its consideration of H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975); discussion in H.R. REP. No.658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-130 (1975).
" The Treasury's "Minimum Taxable Income" (MTI) proposal in 1973 recog-
nized this fact by computing the proposed minimum tax on "expanded adjusted gross
income" which would have had the effect of subjecting itemized personal deductions to
the minimum tax. See Hearings on General Tax Reform Before the House Ways and Means
Committee, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6873, 6985 (1973) (statement of Hon. George P. Shultz,
Secretary of the Treasury). See also H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) adding as a
preference under the minimum tax, itemized deductions in excess of 70% of adjusted
gross income.
63 There is some Treasury data on effective corporate rates contained in the Joint
Hearings on Small .Business Tax Reform Before the Select Comm. on Small Business and Sub-
comm. on Financial Markets of the Senate Finance Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1423, 1430
(1975). This data, however, significantly omits some of the differences between taxable
income and corporate book income and hence overstates effective corporate rates.
" 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-I6(a) (1975).
63 The data are published periodically by Tax Analysts and Advocates in TAX
Notts. For a summary of 1974 data, see Kaplan, Disparity in Corporate Rates Raises Ques-
tions About Underlying Tax Policy, 3 TAX NOTES No. 46, at 13-36 (Nov. 17, 1975). For a
discussion of the technique used to obtain corporate effective rates from the S.E.C.
data, see Kaplan, Effective Corporate Tax Rates, 2 J. CORP. Tax. 187 (1975).
Professor Bittker, in Effective Tax Rates: Fact or Fancy, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 780
(1974) discusses what he perceives to be problems in determining effective rates of tax.
As he correctly observes, one must define the base or measure of income against which
the actual tax paid is applied, in order to obtain the ratio which is the effective rate. He
also observes that various presentations have used varying measures of income. In large
part, however, the variations in the case of those who understand the proper technique
involved are traceable to the lack of adequate data, especially as to individuals. Fur-
thermore, the extent of this data gap changes from time to time. Essentially, for indi-
viduals, one could use taxable income plus tax expenditures plus personal exemptions
as the base; for corporations, corporate book income, i.e., S.E.C. data, may be used.
The problem of achieving agreement on the proper technique is not as difficult as the
Bittker article seems to indicate.
Moreover, the utility of proper effective tax rate analysis is considerably greater
than the above article indicates. It may of course be true that if a number of tax ex-
penditures were eliminated, the present progressive rate structure might be altered
downwards. But the fact remains that the present rate structure is in the law, and peo-
ple generally believe that because of it the well-to-do pay reasonably high income taxes.
Effective tax rate analysis shows that in fact this is not the case—many well-to-do indi-
viduals are in fact escaping the income tax. This is in itself an indication that something
is seriously amiss and an explanation of the causes of this escape is required. Thus, ef-
fective tax rate analysis is a useful key to the issues to be examined: why the escapes
from tax; why the large disparities between effective tax rates and statutory rates; why
large disparities among individuals with the same economic income and among corpo-
rations with the same book income. After all, it is an income tax that is involved—a tax
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This rule requires public corporations to indicate why their provision
for taxes varies from 48 percent of their financial or book income,
and to indicate the amounts attributable to each significant factor in
that variation." The factors, of course, turn out to be the items in the
tax expenditure list in the categories involving business activity. The
principal general factors are the investment credit, accelerated depre-
ciation, and deferral of taxes on foreign subsidiaries. The principal
industry factors are: for oil, depletion and expensing of intangible
drilling costs:" for banks, exemption of state and local bond interest,
excessive deduction for bad debt reserves, and tax shelters:" for
utilities, expensing of construction interest and other capital costs,"
for retailers, the use of installment accounting:" for some drug, and
other manufacturers, the exemption of income earned in the United
States possessions such as Puerto Alai:" for timber, the capital gain
treatment applied to the value of cut timber:" for some exporters, the
use of DISC."
The overall effective rate for eight leading industrial companies
in Fortune Magazine's list for 1974 was 34.6 percent." However, the
which is supported by the public because it believes it to be a fair tax which is geared to
the taxpaytIr's ability to pay. Thus, there is something seriously wrong with such a tax
where a Wealthy person pays the same or less tax on his economic income than a skilled
worker pays on his economic income. The same serious question is raised by the dis-
parities between corporate effective tax rates and the statutory 48% rate.
6" 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-16(a) (1975).
173 TAx NOTES No. 16 at 5 (April 21, 1975); Id. No. 25 at 14 (lune 23, 1975); Id.
No. 28 at 7 (July 14, 1975).
603 TAN NOTES No. 17 at 16 (April 28, 1975)•
69 3 Tx NOTES No. 29 at 14 (July 21, 1975).
703  TAx Milts No. 34 at 14 (Aug. 25, 1975).
73 TAN NOTES No. 31 at 20 (Aug. 4, 1975); Id. No. 42 at 13 (Oct. 20, 1975).
" 3 TAx NOTES No. 22 at 14 (June 2, 1975).
70 3 TAN NOTES No. 32 at 8 (Aug. 11, 1975).
" 3 Tx NOTES No. 46 at 26 (Nov. 17, 1975). This average is unweighted for
company size. The largest company. Exxon, had an effective United States tax rate on
domestic income of 32:7%; its worldwide effective tax rate of 71.3% on worldwide in-
come (and its effective rate on foreign income of 79.6%) is affected by the aspect of the
"non-income tax" components of ftheign income taxes, i.e., royalties or excise' taxes paid
to foreign governments that are labeled "income taxes," included in the latter figures.
(For this reason, the text considers only the leading industrial companies and does not
include the leading oil companies.) The Exxon Company estimated its U.S. rate on
domestic income for 1975 at around 41%, reflecting the 1975 change in percentage de-
pletion; the worldwide rate was estimated at 74.4%: 4 TAx NOTES No. 8 at 11, 13 (Feb.
23, 1976).
Sunley, Effective Corporate Tax Rates: Toward a More Precise Figure, 4 TAX NOTES
No. 9 at 15 (March I, 1976), using national income and products account data and ap-
plying adjustments explained in the article, found a worldwide effective corporate tax
rate on worldwide profits of 32.7% for 1972 and 1973 and 34.1% for 1974 (the 1974
increase is attributed to a significant increase in foreign source oil income and the im-
pact of inflation), and a domestic effective corporate rate on domestic profits of 31.7%
for 1972, 31.2% for 1973 and 31.1% for 1974 (the difference from the worldwide rate
is attributed to high-taxed foreign source oil income). The worldwide figure For 1960
was 40.5%; the domestic figure for 1960 was 40.6%. The divergence between the two
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variation in effective tax rates for different industries and also the
variation among companies in the same industry is quite startling.
Thus, the following shows the variation in effective corporate income
tax rates among various industries in 1974:"
Tobacco 	 46.1%
Personal Care Products 	 44.1%
Chemical
	 39.4%
Electronics 	 37.9%
Paper 	 37.1%
Beverage
	 36.6%
Drugs
	 35.8%
Non-Food Retail 	 35.4%
Aerospace 	 34.1%
Conglomerates 	 34.1%
Metals and Mining 	 30.8%
Office Equipment 	 30.6%
Banks 	 17.0%
Utilities 	 9.2%
The intra-industry variation in effective tax rates can be demonstrated
by a few examples: aerospace companies ranged from 7.7 percent to
47.5 percent; drug companies, from 16.2 percent to 46.6 percent;
non-food retailers, from 6.5 percent to 46.0 percent; conglomerates,
From 22.1 percent to 43.1 percent. The top eight major industrial
firms varied in effective rates from 16.1 percent to 46.5 percent."
These wide variations demonstrate the effect that tax expendi-
ture assistance has on the fairness of the tax system. They also show
the extreme unevenness that results from using the tax system as a
vehicle for government spending. A tax-and-budget-system that pro-
duces these wide swings would seem to be prima facie suspect and
ground for concern.
2. Effective Rate Analysis—The Aspect of "Foregone Income"
Where a tax expenditure is involved, the result is to lower the
effective rate of income tax below the rate that would otherwise exist
under the statutory rate schedule without the tax expenditure. Thus,
for example, if an individual received only tax exempt income, then
his effective tax rate would be zero. The customary effective tax rate
determination compares actual tax paid to total actual income (as de-
figures appeared to commence in 1971.
75 3 TAX NOTES No. 46 at 26-33 (Nov. 17, 1975). The figures represent
worldwide rates on 1974 pre-tax worldwide income as reported to shareholders. For an
interesting discussion of the "subsidy" aspects involved in including foreign taxes paid
in the determination of the effective tax rate, see BIEDERMAN &TUCC11.0, THC TAXATION
OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES: SUMMARY REPORT 19-23 (1975) (National Savings & Loan
League)
7° 3 TAX NOTES No. 46 at 26-33 (Nov. 17, 1975).
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fined in tax expenditures analysis). However, the individual directly
enjoying the tax expenditure benefit may be receiving a lower pretax
gross income than he would have received from a transaction in
which no tax expenditure were involved. Should this lower gross in-
come be reflected in the determination of the effective tax rate? In
other words, should the loss of gross income be considered as a "tax"
paid, thereby producing a higher tax than the actual tax payment and
hence a higher effective tax rate than would be produced if this loss
of gross income were not taken into account?
Suppose that individuals A and B each have the same income
and have the opportunity to invest either in tax-exempt bonds yield-
ing $100,000 of income or in taxable bonds yielding $130,000. A de-
cides to invest in the tax-exempt bonds and B in the taxable bonds. A
pays no tax on the income; B pays $65,000. Ordinarily, A would be
considered as having an effective rate of tax of zero and B an effec-
tive tax rate of 50 percent. However, if A had invested in taxable
bonds his gross income would have been $130,000. Is it proper,
therefore, to conclude that in fact A has paid an imputed "effective
tax rate" of 23.1 percent and that this figure—not zero—is the one to
utilize when comparing the effective tax rates paid by A and B on
their respective incomes?
The approach of imputing a "tax" because of income foregone is
not a useful analytic technique for the policy-maker as part of the de-
termination of effective tax rates. The above example holds true only
in a closed investment world where A's only alternative investment
choice is the taxable investment yielding $130,000. In reality, how-
ever, we do not know the amount of gross income that A has
foregone, since we do not know what A would have done with his
capital had the option of investing in tax-exempt bonds not been pre-
sented. Indeed we cannot know just how well A has done by utilizing
the tax-exempt benefit. All we can say is that A in this example de-
cided to forego 23.1 percent of the gross income he would have re-
ceived had he invested in the particular taxable bonds yielding that
much more than his tax-exempt bonds. This "loss" of 23.1 percent is
not comparable to B's effective tax rate of 50 percent—it merely re -
Elects the yield of particular tax-exempt bonds as compared with that
of particular taxable bonds.
The diminution in A's gross income is thus not the same as a tax
provision stating that if A receives $1.3 million of taxable income, his
tax rate will be 23.1 percent instead of the regular rate schedule.
Rather, A is being given a zero tax rate on his investment in tax-
exempt bonds. How well he does with that investment is up to A. He
may, if he is willing to take some risk, do very well indeed since some
tax-exempt bonds have a yield that is much higher than the 23.1 per-
cent below taxable bond yield used in the above example.
To put the matter another way, suppose that in looking at the
entire range of available investments, A could have invested in a
high-risk oil venture that would have yielded $2.6 million in gross in-
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come. Should we now say that A's "effective rate" is 61.5 percent (a
tax of $1.6 million on the hypothetical $2.6 million)? Indeed this
would suggest that B did not pay a 50 percent effective rate either
since he too opted for a lower yield investment.
A similar situation exists with other tax expenditures. The tax
system grants generous tax benefits to tax shelters. What an investor
in a real estate tax shelter does with his tax shelter investment—how
little he must pay the developer for buying the tax benefits and hence
how large an overall return he obtains—depends on his investment
policies and acumen.
It is therefore neither appropriate nor helpful, as an aspect of
effective tax rate analysis, to attempt to state these varying results to
the different direct beneficiaries of tax expenditures as imputed effec-
tive tax rates. Effective tax rate analysis involves actual incomes and
actual taxes. The construction of a "tax rate" through the imputation
of a hypothetical income that an individual might have received by
following a different investment path and then comparing the
hypothetical income with the individual's actual income is a different
task that should not be associated with effective tax rate analysis. In-
deed in a world of widely varying investment opportunities, each with
its own risks and yields, the task seems generally unproductive." As
far as the Treasury is concerned, A's effective tax rate is zero. Look-
ing at actual dollar flows and actual taxes paid, this is the most useful
way to describe the direct federal income tax consequences for A and
B, and the impact of tax expenditures on horizontal tax equity.
We may of course keep in mind that A is "giving up" some gross
income in using the tax expenditure, which leads us to the discussion
of "efficiency" in the use of tax expenditures and the varying "com-
" In comparing the effective tax rates of commercial banks and savings and loan
associations, a research study for the National Savings and Loan League does discuss
the imputation of a gross income loss for commercial banks investing in tax exempt
bonds, and introduces the result into the effective tax rate comparison. The description
of the analysis used illustrates the problems discussed in the text of this article. The
data also indicate that an adjustment taking account of the "lost income" would produce
only a minor upward adjustment in the effective tax rate obtained in the customary
fashion. BIEDERMAN AND TUCCILO, Miro note 75, at 23-30. This study also analyzes the
"gains" and "losses" resulting from regulatory restrictions placed on financial institu-
tions and seeks to work these effects into an overall effective tax rate, id. at 11-18. This
combination of varying federal measures dues seem confusing. If this method of
analysis is pursued it would seem more appropriate to: (I) compute the conventional
effective tax rate comparison and give the result this descriptive term; (2) describe the
consequences of the lower gross income resulting from utilizing tax expenditures and if
possible quantify the "loss" by a comparison with some alternative standard or custom-
ary income producing activity, and give this figure some descriptive term, such as "cost
of utilizing tax expenditure;" and (3) describe, and if possible quantify, the economic
consequences of regulatory measures and give this figure some descriptive term, such
as "regulatory cost" or "regulatory benefit." If possible, the three figures could then be
combined into an overall quantitative measure, given a descriptive term such as "overall
government subsidy." See also POSNER, TAXATION BY REGULATION, BROOKINGS REPRINT
218 (1971), which analyzes the effects of regulation in tax terms.
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missions" involved in the different tax expenditures." In our
example, A could be regarded as having been paid $35,000 (his net
benefit compared with B) by the Government to deliver a $30,000
check to a state or local government (the benefit in interest saving to
that government). A thus received a "commission" of $35,000 for de-
livering that check. This "commission" results when a tax expenditure
is granted to one person, the "first order beneficiary" (A in the above
example), but the real object of the tax expenditure is another
party—the intended beneficiary (the state or local government issuing
the bond). The intended beneficiary can derive a benefit only if there
is some flow-through of the economic value of the tax expenditure to
the intended beneficiary. The flow-through is usually, however, less
than complete for a variety of reasons depending on the particular
tax expenditure. As a consequence, the first-order beneficiary (the di-
rect taxpayer recipient) receives in effect a "commission" for acting as
the intermediary or "messenger" who delivers the tax subsidy benefits
to the second-order or intended beneficiary (and to others as the sub-
sidy moves through the economy).
This "commission" may be substantial. Its amount is, in effect, a
measure of the inefficiency or lack of effectiveness of the tax expendi-
ture in achieving its intended tax subsidy purpose. A high commission
indicates a wastage of government funds in using the tax expendi-
ture route compared with a direct subsidy to the intended ben-
eficiary. Thus, the tax-exempt bond commission is overall about
one-third of the total revenue loss involved—with some individual
commissions running much higher—indicating a highly inefficient
tax expenditure.'" Tax shelter commissions vary with the particular
tax shelter.""
Even if no monetary commission results, as may be the situation
with the charitable deduction (though the final evidence here is yet to
be obtained)," this does not mean that the "messenger" receives no
value or benefit for his service. Thus, though the direct taxpayer ben-
eficiary of the charitable deduction may convey in full the tax ben-
efit of that deduction (the tax expenditure subsidy) to charitable ben-
eficiaries through an increase in his charitable giving, it is conveyed
to the charitable beneficiaries selected by the taxpayer, so that he is given
the "power" to spend the government funds allocated overall to
charities. 82 Obviously, that "power" has its values to those performing
" See note 52 supra.
"See, e.g., H.R. Rcr. No. 413, 91st Cong:, 1st Sess. 172-73 (1969); SURREY, supra
note ?, at 360.
"See McDaniel, supra note 52.
" For a study showing no direct monetary commission, see Feldstein, The Income
Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part I—Aggregate and Distributional Effects, 28 NAV'. "FAX
J. 81 (1975).
"S
	 MCDANIEL, STUDY or FEDERAL MATCHING GRANTS FOR CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS. pt. 3 (1975) (prepared for the Commission on Private Philanthropy
and Public Needs) (study available from the Commission, Wash., D.C.).
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the selection. As another example, a lessor bank that may derive a rel-
atively small direct commission in arranging a tax shelter lease will
undoubtedly receive business benefits from the activity.
Thus, while the "giving up of income"—performing as a mes-
senger or the deliverer of the tax subsidy check—very often involves
an exercise of real power over government assistance (as in the chari-
table deduction situation or in the decision of what housing will be
built in the real estate tax shelter), the value of this power is difficult
to determine. This seems another reason to remain with conventional
effective tax rate analysis rather than to impute the gross income that
might have been received on an alternative investment and express
the difference between the two incomes as a "tax."
3. Tax Reform, Spending Reform and Simplicity in the Tax System
To return to the main theme of tax reform, it is clear that the
causes of individual tax escape in the United States and the causes of
the aforementioned wide variations in the corporate effective tax
rates lie in the tax expenditure list. 83 As a consequence, and as the
mirror image of this situation, the issues of tax reform in the United
States revolve essentially around proposed and present tax expendi-
tures. To be sure, the matter of overall rate schedules and exemptions
is a constant tax and political issue. But the intense struggles of tax
reform are over tax expenditures." Those groups or activities that
are benefiting from tax expenditure assistance—government
funds—desire to keep those funds. Those interested in tax
reform—tax fairness, horizontal equity, elimination of tax
escape—and also those interested in budget reform—less spending
and more efficient use of government money—seek to reduce those
funds and hence to eliminate or cut back the tax expenditures." Since
83 See text at notes 59-76 supra.
8 ' Thus, while tax reductions through increases in the low income allowance
(minimum standard deduction) and the percentage standard deduction were effected
with relative ease in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 and the Revenue Adjustment Act
of 1975, Congress became stymied in its efforts at more substantive tax reform. The tax
reform bill, on which the House Ways and Means Committee had worked off and on
for three years, finally emerged from the Committee in a less-than-strong form, passed
the House (which actually strengthened the bill)—H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess
(1975)—but was split off from the tax reduction measures by the Senate Finance Com-
mittee to be acted upon in 1976. Virtually all of the tax reform provisions contained in
the House-passed bill involved tax expenditure items.
" Senator Kennedy in 1975 illustrated the connection between tax and budget
reform in an amendment he proposed to Senate Concurrent Resolution 76 (the Second
Concurrent budget resolution required by the Budget Reform Act) which provided for
a $300 million increase in government revenues from tax reform. The amendment,
which was at variance with the strategies necessary to achieve prompt passage of the
budget resolution, was defeated 76-21, with the vote recognizing those strategies. See
121 CoNG. REC. S. 20653 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1975). Senator Kennedy urged that the
Budget Resolution for fiscal 1977 contain a specific figure by which overall tax expendi-
tures would have to be reduced. See 122 CONG. REC. S. 3899 (daily ed. March 22, 1976).
S. Con. Res. 109, The First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget—Fiscal Year
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tax expenditure assistance covers so many fields, these tax reform
struggles spread over a wide range of business and social activity. The
issues, of course, are not tax issues but basic matters of governmental
expenditure policy. Yet they are concentrated in the tax committees,
and hence much of the expertise and insight that would otherwise be
brought to bear on the resolution of the issues is never utilized. Simi-
larly, tax technicians in government and tax practitioners in private
practice are required to spend an inordinate amount of time on areas
in which they have little expertise—pollution control, housing, solar
energy, and the like.
It should also be noted that a study of the causes of complexity
in the tax system would also lead to the tax expenditure list. A nor-
mative income tax is bound to be complex in itself. But a tax system
that encompasses both a normative income tax and a very wide and
expansive set of spending programs will obviously take on a large de-
gree of additional complexity. However, those who criticize modern
tax systems for their complexity fail to see that much of the trouble-
some complexity lies in the tax expenditure process.
C. Constitutional Law Aspect
An aspect of the tax expenditure concept that is beginning to
surface is the constitutional law aspect. Under United States constitu-
tional doctrines, the government may in general not engage in dis-
criminatory activities, as regards race or sex for example, or act with-
out due regard for fair procedures and process. Hence, direct gov-
ernment spending programs that may involve such practices can be
challenged in the courts." Similarly, private entities significantly sup-
ported by government funds and engaging in such practices are also
1977 assumed a $2.0 billion revenue increase for "changes in existing tax expenditures
and related provisions." S. REP. No. 731, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976). The House
Budget Resolution revenue projections similarly assumed "that the Congress will modify
existing tax expenditures to realize a net increase of $2.0 billion in revenues during
fiscal year 1977." REPORT OF THE HOUSE BUDGET COMM. ON H. CON. RES. 611, FIRST
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE BUDGET—FISCAL YEAR 1977, H. REP. No. 1030, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976). The Conference Committee Report stated: The conference
substitute assumes, as did both houses, realization of a net $2 billion increase in rev-
enues through tax reform." H. REP. No. 1008, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Reportedly,
the change in wording from "tax expenditures" in both the House and Senate Budget
Committee Reports to "Tax reform" in the Conference Committee Report was inadver-
tent and did not reflect any substantive change. The term "tax expenditure" is the
more precise and should be adhered to in Budget resolution actions. See text at notes
133-34, infra. The First Concurrent Resolution was approved by both Houses. See 122
Com:. REc. S. 7076 (daily ed. May 12, 1976); 122 CONG. REC. H. 4381-82 (daily ed. may
13, 1976).
The increasing congressional awareness of the identity of tax reform tax expen-
diture issues was reflected in a recent colloquy on tax reform in the Senate. See 122
CONG. REC. S. 5556-86 (daily ed. April 13. 1976).
811 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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subject to challenge." The question now being raised is whether these
constitutional doctrines apply to lax benefits and to private entities re-
ceiving those benefits. 88 Thus, the grant of direct government aid to a
private school or other entity that practices race discrimination would
be unconstitutional." This being so, is the income tax exemption
granted to that school or entity as a charitable organization, or the
grant of a charitable deduction to individuals contributing to the
school or entity, similarly subject to challenge?" A grant of funds to
parents who send their children to parochial schools is unconstitu-
tional as state aid to religion."' Does the granting of an income tax
credit to those parents also violate the Constitution?" As another ex-
ample, it is arguable that an owner of an apartment building con-
structed in part with federal funds cannot evict tenants without allow-
ing them a fair hearing." Is the owner of an apartment building who
utilizes an investment tax credit, accelerated depreciation, and the ex-
pensing of certain construction costs also subject to the same con-
straints?
The underlying issue in the above queries is that of whether
such tax assistance is equivalent to direct assistance. It would seem
that the tax expenditure list is a useful index to those provisions in
the tax system that should be subject to the same constitutional restric-
tions as parallel programs financed by direct government spending.
The lawyers involved in litigating in this area, however, have not yet
fully perceived the significance of the tax expenditure concept, and
hence the courts have yet to effectively utilize it. The courts have,
however, in several instances acted to subject tax assistance to the yet
" See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
8" For a discussion of the doctrine of "state action" in relation to governmental
assistance through both direct and tax expenditures, see Brown, State Action Analysis of
Tax Expenditures, 11 HARV. Crv. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 97 (1976).
89 Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm., 275 F. Supp. 833 (ED. La.
1967), off d, 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
%See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (indicating the tax
benefits are unconstitutional); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd
without opinion, sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
" See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
"See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. N3'quist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973), holding both direct grant and tax credit unconstitutional. In addition to the
cases cited in note 90 supra, and Nyquist, see the following cases where, although the
grant of tax assistance was upheld, the courts appeared to apply rules applicable to di-
rect government expenditure programs: Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664 (1970);
Marker v. Shultz, 485 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1973); McCoy v. Shultz, 73-1 U.S.T.C.19233
(D.D.C. 1973). See also Comment, Tax Incentives as State Action, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 414 (1973);
Note, The Internal Revenue Code and Racial Discrimination, 72 CoLum. L. REV. 1215 (1972);
Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82
YALE L.J. 51 (1972); Comment, Religion in Politics and the Income Tax Exemption, 42 FORDHAM
L. REV. 397 (1973).
8° See Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 880, 904 n.115 (1973).
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strictions that would apply to direct programs." This entire field is
still in a formative state and presents extremely interesting and impor-
tant questions for both tax systems and constitutional law.
VII. GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS ASPECTS
A. Legislative Process
1. The Budget Act Framework
The Budget Reform Act and the congressional structure and
process it created for consideration of budgetary matters will, in all
likelihood, cause increased attention to be given to the tax expendi-
ture concept in the years ahead. Thus, that Act established a Senate
Budget Committee and a House Budget Committee whose essential
functions are to develop an overall congressional approach to the an-
nual budget process.? 5 One duty specifically assigned to these Com-
mittees is
to request and evaluate continuing studies of tax expendi-
tures, to devise methods of coordinating tax expenditures,
policies and programs with direct budget outlays, and to
report the results of such studies to the Senate (House) on
a recurring basis ... . 96
The Act also created the Congressional Budget Office, with a Director
and a large staff." One of the duties assigned to that Office is that of
providing information to congressional Committees with respect to
bills providing tax expenditures and related general information on
tax expenditures." Further, as earlier described," the Act requires
the President to include a list of tax expenditures in his annual
Budget" (Special Analysis F in the 1976 and 1977 Budgets). It also'
requires each Budget Committee, in reports accompanying its First
Concurrent Resolution fixing the initial overall budget amount, to
state the projected levels of tax expenditures.'°' In preparation for
such Budget Committee reports, the tax committees, just as other
standing committees are required to report their programs as to di-
" See material cited in notes 90 and 92supra. In some cases,e.g., Marker v. Shultz, 485
F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1973), McCoy v. Shultz, 73-1 U.S.T.C.,119233 (D.D.C. 1973) and junior
Chamber of Comm. v. The United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974), the courts
seem also to be assuming that tax exemption given to an organization is not per se sufficient
assistance to invoke constitutional sanctions, usually referring to Walz v, Tax Comm., 397
U.S. 664 (1970). This indicates the need for further analysis of such tax exemption provi-
sions, see note 35 supra,
" Budget Act, supra note 2, §§ 101, 102.
"Id. §§ 101(c), 102(a).
"Id. 201.
1/8 Id. §§ 202, 308(b), (c).
9° See text at notes 1, 2 supra.
'°° Budget Act, supra note 2, 601.
'°' Id. 	 301(a), (d).
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rect expenditures, must, by March 15, submit to the Budget Commit-
tees information concerning their programs that can effect increases
or decreasesin the appropriate level of federal revenues.'82 Presum-
ably such reports should include proposed changes in tax expendi-
tures. Also: the tax committees are required in the reports accom-
panying any bills involving tax expenditures to state how the bills af-
fect the existing tax expenditure levels.'" There can be no bill consid-
ered decreasing _revenues (and hence presumably increasing tax ex-
penditures) until the initial budget resolution is adopted, and, after
the resolution fixing the final budget limit there can be no tax
expenditure legislation that would reduce the total revenues below the
figure in the latter resolution."'
Under this framework, the Senate and House Budget Commit-
tees have each established a Task Force relating to tax expend-
itures.'05 Also the Congressional Budget Office has a unit, headed
by an Assistant Director for Tax Policy, charged among other
duties with analyzing tax expenditures. The members and staffs in-
volved are now beginning to chart their future steps. It is likely they
will begin by analyzing, on an ad hoc basis, some of the new tax ex-
penditures involved in current proposals as well as some significant
existing tax expenditures.'" In certain areas, they may also engage in
cooperative studies of the interrelationships of tax expenditures and
direct programs, with the legislative committees having jurisdiction
over the direct programs and the staffs of the tax committees.'°7 Such
cooperative studies in the various fields covered by tax expenditures
are an obvious necessity, since as indicated above,"8 the basic ques-
tions for tax expenditures are whether the particular monetary assis-
tance involved is a national goal, and if so, whether that assistance
should be handled via the direct budget or channelled through the
tax system. If the answer for a specific item turns out to be that
Id. 30I(c). For an example of the considerations affecting the report of the
tax committees to the Budget Committees, see SENATE FIN. COMM.. DATA AND MATERIALS
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1977 FIN. COMM. REPORT UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET Am.,
94th Cong., 2i1 Sess. (Comm. Print, Feb. 23, 1976).
103 Budget Act, supra note 2, § 308(a). For an example of such a report provision,
see H.R. REP. No. 19, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1975).
104 Budget Act, supra note 2, §§ 303(a), 31I(a) and Conference Report thereon.
1°5 3 TAX NOTES No. 30 at 10 (July 28, 1975).
For example, Senator Kennedy proposed that the Congressional Budget Of-
fice institute a study on methods of providing federal assistance for construction and
rehabilitation of low income housing. 122 CONG. REC. S. 3755, 3761 (daily ed. March 22,
1976).
For a proposal to institute such a study in the agricultural area, see Hearings
on Tax Reform Before the Howe Ways and Means Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1362 (1975)
(statement of Paul R. McDaniel).
The Congressional Budget Office is undertaking a study of tax expenditures and
direct programs in the area of housing, which involves the staff of the CBO, and the
staffs of the Congressional tax and housing committees. See also 122 CONG. REC. S. 3761
(daily ed. March'18, 1976) (statement of Senator Kennedy).
1°8 See text at notes 39-40 supra.
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monetary assistance is desirable but that it should be handled as a di-
rect program, then obviously coordinated legislative action is needed
to drop the tax expenditure and adopt the direct program, and to in-
sure the proper transitional steps. In recognition of this need for
coordination, the so-called Hansen resolution of 1974 108 regarding the
House Committee structure provides that each legislative committee
must review and study on a continuing basis the impact or probable
impact of tax policies affecting subjects within its jurisdiction.
2. Impact of Committee Jurisdictions
The legislative aspects of enacting and revising tax expenditures
have a special focus in the United States because of the kommittee
system operating within Congress, including the large professional
staffs employed by the Congress. In the United States, committee
jurisdiction in Congress is of critical importance. With respect to tax
expenditures and related aspects, what is beginning to emerge as a
crucial matter is the ease with which many legislative issues can be-
come "tax matters" through a simple restructuring of the suggested
solution, and hence fall within the jurisdiction of the tax committees
rather than within that of the legislative committees otherwise having
jurisdiction over the area. While the House and Senate must of course
ultimately pass on any bill reported by a committee, it is of great im-
portance which committee, which committee chairman, which com-
mittee staff—and often as a concomitant—which executive agency,
develop the bill. Put another way, the tax committees have the juris-
dictional ability to take over much of the legislative field by providing
a "tax answer" to the issue.
Thus, if it is a question of increasing the conservation of energy
by encouraging home owners to insulate their homes or by encourag-
ing business firms to utilize solar energy, the legislative committees
with jurisdiction in the energy area can produce a program of direct
assistance for these activities. But the tax committees can obtain
jurisdiction—and the Treasury can enter the act—by providing a tax
incentive for these activities, such as a special tax deduction or credit
for money spent on home insulation or solar energy equipment."° If it
is a matter of encouraging the purchase of new homes, while the
banking committees could offer direct assistance, the tax committees
can obtain jurisdiction by providing a tax credit for such purchases.'''
These simple examples may be applied to almost any issue involving
100 H.R. REs. 988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 916 (Part II),
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 65-69, 119 (1974).
"° See, e.g., the House-passed version of the Energy Conservation and Conver-
sion Act of 1975, H.R. 6860, H.R. REP. No. 221, 94th Cong., lst Sess. 48, 51 (1975). For
a topical discussion of the energy bill, see Drew, The Energy,Bazaar, Tiff NEW YORKER
at 35 (July 21, 1971).
"I See INC. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 44, enacted in 1975 but not extended in the
Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975.
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government assistance. The approach can also apply to issues involv-
ing government control. Thus if it is thought desirable to discourage
energy waste by restricting the use of automobiles consuming excess
amounts of gasoline, the legislative committees could produce a pro-
gram of direct regulation and controls utilizing certain standards and
direct sanctions. But the tax committees can obtain jurisdiction by
providing an excise tax on the sale of such automobiles, thereby utiliz-
ing the same standards though applying a tax instead of a regulatory
sanction.'" The same approach can extend to pollution control or
any field in which an excise tax or other tax sanction can be devised.
It may be seen that the use of tax sanctions to control conduct is akin
to the use of expenditures to encourage conduct. Both control and
encouragement are essentially governmental non-tax policies en-
grafted onto a normative tax system and channelled through it in-
stead of being pursued through the use of direct non-tax programs.
All this being so, the need for further thinking about these prob-
lems is clear. The jurisdictional situation among congressional com-
mittees is but a surface indication of deeper problems centering on
the appropriate uses of the tax system. Tax expenditure analysis is
teaching us that important issues lie within the questions of when de-
sired government assistance should be provided through direct pro-
grams and when through the tax system, and what are the criteria ap-
plicable to and the consequences of that choice. An extension of that
analysis is beginning to teach us that similar issues lie within the ques-
tions using the same standards." 3 The appropriate forums for the
resolution of these questions should, for the Congress, primarily be
the new Budget Committees and the new Congressional Budget Of-
fice. In the Executive Branch the forums should be the Office of
Budget and Management in the President's Executive Office and the
Treasury Department.
There are indications that the congressional forums are begin-
ning to see their responsibilities. Certainly the structure now exists in
the Congress to consider these basic questions as well as their surface
manifestations in committee jurisdictional disputes. (There are many
possible solutions to such disputes, such as joint action by a tax com-
mittee and a legislative committee, divided but coordinated action by
the two, and so on. The basic questions earlier mentioned 14 that un-
derlie the jurisdictional- aspects are more difficult to answer.) The
structure is new, however, and much will depend upon the degree to
which those who operate it demonstrate perception, skill and diplo-
macy in determining the guidance needed for committee and con-
gressional conduct. Unfortunately, however, parallel understanding of
' 12 See H.R. REP. No.221, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1975).
" 3 For preliminary discussion, see SURREY. supra note 7, at 155 et seq. See also A.
KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE. POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975) [hereinafter cited
as KNEESE & SCHULTZE].
'" See text at notes 110-14 supra.
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the problems and the need for guidance in the solutions does not ap-
pear to exist currently within the Executive Branch. The Treasury
Department is clearly situated at the center of these issues and a re-
sponsible Treasury would be working forcefully to seek their resolu-
tion. At the moment, this is not the case in the United States. But
academic tax professionals do recognize the issues and are devoting
attention to them." 5
3. Some Aspects of the 1975 Experience
The attention being given to tax expenditure analysis in the
United States is beginning to have its effect on legislative debate and
decision. The 1975 energy legislation illustrated the situation. The
House tax committee ; the Ways and Means Committee, took jurisdic-
tion over that legislation and, as required by jurisdictional rules, pro-
ceeded to consider tax-oriented solutions. Examples were an increase
in the tax on gasoline, an excise tax on automobiles consuming large
quantities of gasoline, and tax incentives to encourage energy conser-
vation such as incentives for the installation of solar energy equipment
and home insulation."" The resolution of the particular issues need
not concern us. The House did debate the matter of regulatory sanc-
tions versus tax sanctions for automobiles and for various ad hoc
reasons favored the former.'" The treatment of tax incentives in this
area is instructive. The Ways and Means Committee adopted several
tax incentives but the House, in large part using tax expenditure talk,
debated these and ended up approving some and defeating others.'"
One significant aspect of the legislative familiarity with tax ex-
penditure analysis is that the individual tax incentives, such as those
for home insulation or solar energy equipment, were structured as
credits against tax instead of deductions so as to limit their "upside-
down" effect.'" A few years ago these incentives in all _probability
would have been structured as deductions with decided "upside-
down" effect. Moreover, in the Senate Finance Committee, tentative
consideration was given to making these incentives refundable where
an individual's tax is insufficient to absorb the credit. 1 z" A refundable
tax credit is in effect a direct spending program going to taxpayers
and non-taxpayers in equal amounts and is not as tainted by either
the "upside-down" aspect or the restriction to taxpayers that charac-
"8 See, e.g., SURREY, supra note 7, K NEESE & SCHULTZE, SuPra note 113; Statement
of Paul R. McDaniel, supra note 40.
16 See notes 111  abd 113 supra.
'"See House Floor Debate on the Energy Conservation and Conversion Act, 121
CoNG. REC. H. 5350-5400 (daily ed., June 12, 1975).
" 8 For examples, see 121 CONG. REC. H. 5426-60 (daily ed. June 13, 1975); id. at H.
5659-76 (daily ed. June IS, 1975); id. at H. 5727-51 (daily ed. June 19, 1975).
H.R. REP. NO. 221, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1975).
120 Goodnough, Senate Finance Reports Out Windfall Tax Measure, 3 TAX NOTES No.
3I at 23-26 (Aug. 4, 1975).
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terize the usual tax incentives.)2' Moreover, in the Tax Reduction Act
of 1975,122 the new 10% earned income tax credit (applicable to
families with children with up to $4,000 of earnings, and then taper-
ing off) was made refundable.'" Also, President Ford in 1974 had
recommended that the investment tax credit essentially be made
refundable.'24 In 1976, the Senate-passed tax credit for wages paid to
welfare recipients employed by child care centers was made refund-
able, so as to benefit public and non-profit centers as well as the for-
profit centers.126
All this indicates that tax expenditure analysis and the guidance
it suggests regarding the choice between tax assistance and direct as-
sistance, with the consequent effects on budget efficiency and tax re-
form, are beginning to be understood by legislators.'26 The pattern of
But see note 43 supra.
122 Act of March 29, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 27.
'231d. § 204 (codified at IN'I'. REV. CODE or 1954, $ 43). The credit applied to
1975 and was extended for the first 6 months of 1976 by the Revenue Adjustment Act
of 1975, Act of Dec. 23, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-164, $ 2.88 Stat. 970.
"'See U.S. TREAS. DEFT FACT SHEET, A PROGRAM TO CONTROL INFLATION IN A
HEALTHY AND GROWING ECONOMY, TREAS. Doc. No. WS-I22 at 38 (Oct. 8, 1974), issued
in conjunction with the PRESIDENTS ADDRESS TO CONGRESS. H. Doc. No. 93-366 (Oct. 8,
1974). See also Smiley, Towards a More Neutral Investment Tax Credit, 26 NATI. TAN J. 209
(1973). A proposal to make the credit taxable and refundable was set forth in
McDaniel, Tax Reform and the Revenue Act of 1971: Lesions, Lagniappes and Lessons, 14
B.C. IND.& COM. L. REV. 813, 838-39 (1973).
125 See note 43 supra.
26 For example, as to budget efficiency, see the following from the RErogt OF
TIIE SENATE BUDGET COMM. ON THE FIRST CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 'ON THE
BUDGET—FISCAL YEAR 1977 AND TIIE BUDGET FOR THE TRANSITION QUARTER, S. REP. No.
731, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976):
Tax expenditures are revenue losses that occur as a result of Fed-
eral tax provisions that grant special tax relief to encourage certain kinds
of activities by taxpayers or to aid taxpayers in special circumstances. The
net result of these provisions is equivalent to a simultaneous collection of
revenue and a direct budget outlay of an equal amount....
The Committee believes it is as important to control the growth of tax
expenditures as it is to control the growth of direct spending programs. Tax
expenditures must be subject to the same standards of review as are spending
programs if the new congressional budget process is to have a positive effect
over the complete spectrum of Federal budget management.
As one step toward establishing revenue review, the Budget Com-
mittee recommends, as a tat-get, the enactment of legislation which would
result in a net increase of $2.0 billion in fiscal 1977 revenue collections by
changes in existing tax expenditure and related provisions.
Tax expenditures often are enacted with phased-in or. deferred ef-
fective dates. As with some spending programs, such new tax expenditure
provisions may have a relatively small influence on revenues in the year in
which they are enacted. Their budgetary impact is similar to that of a di-
rect outlay "wedge" which is a small slice of a spending program that is
approved with a limited initial outlay that will increase in subsequent years.
For this reason, it is particularly important that the long-term budgetary
effects of new tax expenditures be carefully considered at the time of
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new tax assistance is commencing to change. Moreover, such new tax
assistance is beginning to be directly challenged by those who prefer
the direct assistance route, or at least see the need to consider the
non-tax alternative.'" The debates over the issues are becoming bet-
ter informed and more relevant. There are the beginnings in some
areas of efforts to shift from existing tax expenditures to direct
assistance.'" Hopefully, this trend will continue as the new congres-
sional units—the Budget Committees and the Congressional Budget
Office—and their staffs become more familiar with the field and
commence to exert leadership.
This is not to say that the changes will be rapid. The tax com-
mittees still desire to expand their activities and they can only do so
enactment. The "wedge" effect also is important in the context of reduc-
ing tax expenditures. Because the termination ,of a tax expenditure provi-
sion may involve the choice of an effective date at some time in the future
or may be phased over a number of years, revenue gains from a termina-
tion of or reduction in tax expenditures may be much smaller in the year
of enactment than they will be when they become fully effective. The im-
pact of reducing tax expenditures should not be minimized because the
revenue gain may be small in the year of enactment.
As to tax reform, see the study of the staff of the HOUSE BUDGET COMM. ON DISC,
AN ANALYSIS Or DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATIONS, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).
1 " Senator Muskie in the Senate floor debate on the Financial Institutions Act of
1975, S. 1267, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), which involved a new tax expenditure rec-
ommended by the Treasury in the form of a tax credit for a percentage of mortgage
interest on residential mortgages—the issue being put in abeyance through the unique
device of the Senate's passing the legislation, which contains new regulations regarding
financial institutions, but making it effective only if the credit is voted—stated that as
Chairman of the Budget Committee, he was serving notice that the Committee would
have to consider the matter:
These are extremely substantial sums of money the Federal Gov-
er:Intent will be foregoing indefinitely if the combined new regulatory
rules and tax credit are ultimately enacted. These sums are justified by
proponents of the legislation as necessary to insure that adequate funds
flow into residential mortgage lending activities.
The Budget Committee will be striving hard to reduce future
budget deficits to a minimum. Therefore, the case for enactment of this
new credit must be compelling since its adoption will make it that much
more difficult to balance the budget or to permit general tax cuts in the
future.
Careful consideration must be given to whether the proposed mort-
gage interest credit is necessary as well as whether it is the most efficient
means of assuring adequate home mortgage funds compared with other
possible nontax forms of governmental assistance.
121 CONG. lift S. 21835 (daily ed. Dec. 1 I, 1975). See also Hearings held by the Hottse
Budget Committee Tax Expenditures Task Force on the President's recommendations for
tax benefits for electric utilities and a mortgage interest tax credit, supra note 107.
The House Budget Committee Report on the First Concurrent Resolution on the
Budget—Fiscal Year 1977 especially rejected the President's recommendation for new
tax expenditures For public utilities and the mortgage interest tax credit. See HOUSE
BUDGET COMM. REP.SRpra note 85, at 39, 46.
128 See, e.g., Reuss-Kennedy Bill, H.R. 11214 and S. 2800, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975), providing for optional taxable municipal bonds; Hearings on Optional Taxable
Bonds, supra note 52.
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through resort to tax expenditures and tax sanctions.n° The congres-
sional staffs for the tax committees, though prekumably perceiving the
issues, are restricted by their masters and either do not appear to be
offering guidance on the basic question of the choice between tax and
direct routes or appear to be lending support to the tax route. The
other legislative committees are slow to perceive the appro-
priateness—"need" is a better term—of asserting their jurisdic-
tion to provide the assistance rather than yielding the programs to the
tax committees.' 3° The present Treasury Department and Executive
Office have a warm fondness for using tax incentives for the pro-
grams they prefer and are otherwise either generally irresolute about,
or uninterested in, the basic issues involved in spending through the
tax system. In the present setting, if guidance and change do come, it
will be through the new congressional units, public interest groups,
and the academic persons interested in tax expenditure analysis and
the related field of tax sanctions versus direct sanctions.
In Note the following report of observations of Senate Fin. Comm. Chairman
Long during Committee discussions of a proposal for a tax credit to homeowners who
replace inefficient furnaces:
Mr. Dole: What if someone is too poor to pay taxes? Mr. Long: Let's make
this a refundable tax credit.... Refuliclability makes it clear this is a tax
expenditure. Fritz Mondale put in the Congressional Record the other day
how much tax expenditures cost. But so what? Let's call it what it is as I
said the other day. (On a previous day Sen. Long had noted, "Professor
Surrey and, I suppose, Ralph Nader have said these tax breaks are really
tax expenditures, but that label doesn't bother me. I've never been con-
fused about it. I've always known that what we were doing was giving gov-
ernment money away.") I'd like to have at least one tax expenditure in
there I can brag about and say here's one I like ....
Of course when it comes to helping homeowners, if I were on the
Banking Committee, I'd favor a loan guarantee for them because that
would be in my jurisdiction, but Since I'm on the Finance Committee I
favor the use of tax credits.
PEOPLE AND T 'NES 2, 5 (Aug. 1975).
"3" An obvious area in which coordination is needed between the congressional
tax committees and the appropriate legislative committees—Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs in the Senate, and Banking, Currency and Housing in the House—is
that of rental housing, and yet the latter Committees have been slow in seeking ways to
achieve the needed coordination. As a consequence, meaningful tax reform in the real
estate tax shelter area has been blocked, in considerable pan because of the previous re-
luctance of the Housing Committees to consider whether there is a need for direct as-
sistance to replace the inefficient and inequitable tax assistance involved in such tax
shelters. See Kurtz, Tax Incentives for Real Estate Have Failed, 3 REAL ESTATE REV. No. 2
at 66 (Summer 1973). A good deal of the blame lies also with HUD, and also with the
housing lobbyists. These lobbyists assert that their objection to tax reform is that it
would remove needed monetary assistance and that the two sets of committees will not
coordinate in substituting the needed direct assistance. However, the lobbyists appar-
ently have made no effort to use their considerable lobbying muscle to achieve that
coordination. This lack of coordination appears to be changing, however, and the Con-
gressional Budget Office is now conducting a study in the housing area that involves
the staffs of the CBO, the tax committees and the housing committees.
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4. Development of Effective Mechanisms for Coordinating Tax Ex-
penditures and Direct Expenditures
The essential and necessary connection between tax expendi-
tures and direct expenditures is clearly recognized in the Budget Re-
form Act. The task is therefore to develop the mechanisms that will
make the connection an operationally effective part of the overall
congressional process under that Act of relating expenditures to rev-
enues and thereby establishing a congressional fiscal policy. There
are, as previously described, sufficient building blocks in the Budget
Reform Act to achieve those mechanisms. A rational use of those
building blocks would envisage the following procedure. The tax ex-
penditures would be classified according to the functional categories
used by the Budget Committees for direct expenditures. A bill in-
creasing the tax expenditures in any category could not be considered
in the House or Senate prior to the first Budget resolution, just as a
bill providing for new budget authority cannot be considered—this
seems to be a rational reading of section 303 prohibiting the consider-
ation of bills decreasing revenues. The tax committees should by
March 15 inform the Budget Committees of proposals to increase or
decrease tax expenditures by functional categories, just as the other
committees must inform the Budget Committees of programs affect-
ing budget outlays and new budget authority—this seems to be a ra-
tional reading of the obligation imposed on the tax committees under
section 301(c) in view of the obligation in turn placed on the Budget
Committees under section 301(d)(6) to accompany the first resolution
with a report stating the estimated level of tax expenditures by major
functional categories. This reading also dovetails with the duty of the
Congressional Budget Office under section 202(0(1) to report to the
Budget Committees by April 1 on changes in the levels of tax expen-
ditures. The Budget Committees would then be in a position, when
they reported in their first resolution the appropriate level of total
budget outlays and the recommended level of federal revenues (sec-
tion 301(a)(I) and (4)), to state the assumptions regarding both direct
expenditures and tax expenditures in each functional category that
underlay their recommendations on outlays and revenues.
The Budget Committees, in their resolutions in 1975, adopted
the procedure of explicitly stating their assumptions as to the amounts
to be allocated to specific programs within functional categories.' 3 '
They also directed that there be an overall reduction in revenues. 132
Further, in the first resolution, in 1975, they assumed that $1 billion
in revenue would be achieved through "tax reform legislation." 233 Ex-
perience has indicated that "tax reform" is too vague a term to be
131 See First and Second Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget and Conference
Reports, H.R. REP. No. 198, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).•
' 32 Id.
" 3 See H.R. REP. No. 698, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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used for such an assumption in a budget resolution—as Chairman
Long stated in floor debate: "[Tax reform] means anything that can
muster 51 votes in the Senate."34 But a budget resolution could
meaningfully assume that $X billion in revenue be raised through re-
ducing "net tax expenditures," and thus avoid the vagueness of an as-
sumption using the term "tax reform."
The structure and intention of the Budget Reform Act permit
going even further than this overall action regarding tax expendi-
tures. Thus, as to some tax expenditures, it is clear that if they are
reduced, additional sums could and should be made available through
direct programs. One ready example is that of legislation providing
for optional taxable bonds to be issued by state and local governments
with an interest subsidy paid by the federal government. This would
reduce tax expenditures in the functional category of "Revenue Shar-
ing and general purpose fiscal assistance"35 but would increase direct
outlays in that category. Another example is that of proposals to re-
strict or eliminate real estate tax shelters, which, while reducing tax
expenditures, would presumably require an increase in direct outlays
for low and perhaps middle income housing.'36 The Budget Commit-
tees are obligated to achieve that coordination, and indeed may pro-
vide the only effective congressional mechanism for such needed
coordination.
The many provisions of the Budget Reform Act requiring details
and procedures regarding tax expenditures clearly point to the con-
clusion that those expenditures should ultimately be directly coordi-
nated with budget outlays in each functional category. Thus, it would
be appropriate for the Budget Committees, in the reports and ex-
planatory statements on their budget resolutions describing their as-
sumptions and objectives, to state that, in a particular functional cate-
gory, they are assuming that tax expenditures will be reduced (or in-
creased) by $X and direct outlays increased (or reduced) by $X or $Y.
Indeed, a particular tax expenditure and a particular direct program
could be specified. This specificity as to direct programs is already
being utilized in the statements accompanying the budget resolutions
and, as stated above, the Budget Reform Act clearly points to the
utilization of a similar specificity as to tax expenditures. Indeed, as to
new .tax expenditure programs recommended by the President, it is
necessary for the Budget Committees to state their assumptions as to
such programs and, if they consider it desirable to use government
funds for those programs, to determine whether the funds should be
spent through a tax expenditure or a direct expenditure. Glowing
statements on holding budget expenses down are without meaning if
134 121 CONG. REc. S. 20655 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1975). See also it at S. 20653-62.
As indicated supra note 85, the first Resolution in 1976 closely paralleled the language
suggested in the text.
135 See Appendix A.
'"See 122 CONG. REC. S. 2522-25 (daily ed. March I. 1976). (statement of Senator
Kennedy).
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at the same time new programs are phrased as tax expenditures and
total real expenditures thus increased.
It must be recognized, in thinking about these mechanisms for
coordination, that the tax committees—because of their jurisdiction
over tax expenditures—are exercising jurisdiction over all functional
categories in which tax expenditures exist. Hence, since the Budget
Committees must present assumptions and objectives as to these func-
tional categories and thus must pass directly on the programs of legis-
lative committees and the appropriations of appropriation committees,
the Budget Committees must equally consider the programs of the tax
committees that relate through tax expenditures to the same func-
tional categories. Coordination as to tax expenditures, by functional
categories' 37 or particular tax expenditures within a category, thus
presents a different situation from the mechanisms relating to general
revenue raising or reduction. Thus, the Budget Committees, if they
feel revenues in the fiscal sense should be increased or decreased, can
well leave the contours of the change to the tax committees. As to tax
expenditures, however, since the tax committees act both as legislative
and appropriations committees, and do so over the entire range of
functional categories, the relationship of the Budget Committees to
that phase of the work of the tax committees should necessarily be the
same as it is to other committees.
The nature of tax legislation regarding tax expenditures does
present an aspect that must be kept in mind in developing these
mechanisms. Many changes regarding tax expenditures involve effec-
tive dates and transitional arrangements that make the fiscal impact of
a change quite different in the initial years following the change from
that in later years. Thus, the elimination of a tax expenditure
phased in over five years can show a small revenue gain in the first
year and increasing amounts of revenue gain over the next four
years. In the fifth year, when the transition is ended, the revenue gain
will then approximate the amount presently listed for the tax expend-
iture, under the procedure used for estimating tax expenditures.
Moreover, as to the first year, the revenue gain will depend upon the
effective date of the change, which could be late in the budgetary
fiscal year involved and hence the revenue gain involved in the tax
expenditure change may be quite small for that fiscal year. Of course,
the adoption of a new tax expenditure can follow the same course,
but here with gradual increases in the revenue lost through the new
tax expenditure. New tax expenditures that appear to have little ef-
fect on the revenue can soon grow into major and costly programs.
Direct expenditure changes can also show these characteristics, but the
effective date and transitional aspects are likely to be more significant
' 37 THE CONGRESSIONAL. BUIXIEE OFFICE FIVE YEAR BUDGET PROJECHONS, FISCAL
YEARS 1977.81, 15-40 (Jan. 26, 1976), does include a discussion of tax expenditures in
its analysis of various Program Issues. The House Budget Comm. Rep. on the first res-
olution in 1976, supra note 85, did list the tax expenditures that related to each budget
function.
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and more prevalent for tax expenditures. These effects must be taken
into account in deriving the assumptions and objectives of the Budget
Committees when tax expenditures are involved, and for any direct
expenditure change similarly structured. However, these considera-
tions should not present any problems. Rather, they underscore the
wisdom of requiring the Budget Committees, in the reports on their
resolutions, to include five year projections of outlays and tax
expenditures.'"
The Budget Committees thus have the authority under the
Budget Reform Act to develop efficient mechanisms to coordinate tax
expenditures and direct expenditures. An appropriate exercise of that
authority, together with a comparable approach in the Executive :
branch, would achieve a rational and effective control over both types
of expenditures and thereby improve both budget policy and tax pol-
icy.
B. Executive Departments
While the Treasury Department and Office of Management and
Budget have for some time been active in developing the tax expendi-
ture budget," 9 the use of the concept by other executive departments
has been slow to materialize. What has been stated above indicates
that the various departments and agencies responsible for administra-
tion of federal programs should have a lively interest in tax expendi-
ture programs. Yet there is only a smattering of evidence that this is
so.
The need for coordination of tax expenditure and direct
expenditure policies in Congress applies equally to the Executive
branch. It is incongruous, for example, that the largest single agricul-
tural aid program in the United States is run, not by the Department
of Agriculture, but by the Internal Revenue Service.'" It seems self-
evident that the Department charged with developing and executing
farm policy should assure itself that the tax expenditure programs
for agriculture are at least consistent with overall agriculture
policy—existing and proposed. Fortunately, some economists within
the Department of Agriculture recognize this fact and have instituted
studies to analyze the tax provisions as federal subsidies for farm
operations.' 4 ' Significantly, in each case, the tax programs have been
13“ Budget Act, supra note 2, § 301(c1)(6).
In The various Budget Special Analyses in the areas of Health, Education, Train-
ing, Income Security, State and Local Assistance, and Research now recognize that tax
expenditures do provide significant assistance in these areas, though they have yet to
integrate the tax data with the direct outlay data and to analyze the differing distribu-
tional effects of the two types of assistance. Those who worked on the Environmental
analysis apparently did not get the word and did not mention the tax expenditures in
this field.
"° See Statement of Paul R. McDaniel, supra note 40.
Ill HARRISON AND WOODS, FARM AND NONFARM INVESTMENTS IN COMMERCIAL
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found wanting when examined under principles employed to evaluate
direct farm programs. But the findings of these researchers do not
yet appear to have influenced Department policy with respect to farm
tax expenditures, or to have been noticed by the Treasury Depart-
ment.
Some groups within the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment have also shown an increasing awareness of the need for
study and analysis of tax expenditure programs for housing. 142 And it
is encouraging that when the Senate was considering extension of the
tax credit for new home purchases, 145 Senator Brooke requested an
evaluation of the effectiveness of the credit, not from the Treasury,
but from Secretary Hills of HUD.'" HUD, not the Treasury, is the
agency that should be the repository of housing expertise. The fact
that HUD already had underway a study of the housing tax credit at
the time of Senator Brooke's inquiry reflects an increasing awareness
on the part of this Department of its responsibilities to properly
analyze and evaluate tax expenditures that are within its programatic
scope.
As another example, it would seem appropriate that the various
special provisions in the Internal Revenue Code affecting health
care" should be examined as part of the study of national health in-
surance. However, one can review nine volumes of testimony before
the Ways and Means Committee in 1974 on national health insurance
without finding a single reference to the existing tax expenditure
health programs.'" Fortunately, other agencies of government" 5 and
various academics 145 have recognized the need for critical analysis,
BREEDING HERDS: INCENTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES 01."ruE TAX LAW, ERS-497, U.S.
DEVF. OF AGR. (1972); WOODS AND CARLIN, UTILIZATION OF SPECIAL FARM TAX RULES AND
AGRICULTURE, SPECIAL REPORT 172 (Agricultural Experiment Station, Univ. of
Mo.—Columbia, 1975); CARI.IN A: WOODS, TAX Loss FARMING, ERS-546, U.S. DEPT. OF
AGR, (1974).
142 See U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, STUDY ON TAX
CONSIDERATIONS IN MULTI-FAMILY HOUSING INVESTMENTS (Touche Ross & Co. report
under HUD contract H-1227).
' 43 See INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 44.
1 " 121 CONG. REC. S. 22174-75 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1975). Despite HUD's ex-
tremely lukewarm response to the efficacy of the credit in achieving its avowed
objective—removing the inventory overhang from the housing market—the Senate by a
vote of 48-44 approved a six-month extension of the tax credit. 121 CONG. REC. S.
22178 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1975). The conference committee, however, deleted the provi-
sion. H.R. REP. No. 739, 94th Cong, 1st Sess. 10 (1975).
145 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ .'04-06, 213.
'" Hearings on National Health Insurance Before the House Ways & Means Comm.,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
141 See MITCHELL AND VOGEL, H EALTH AND TAXES: AN ASSESSMENT orri a: MEDICAL
DEDUCTION. PREPARED FOR THE. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, R-1222-0E0 (Rand
Corp., 1973).
14 ' See, e.g., K. DAVIS, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 85 (Brookings Institution,
1975); FELDSTEIN AND ALLISON, TAX SUBSIDIES OF PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE:
DISTRIBUTION, REVENUE Loss AND EFFECTS, DISCUSSION PAPER 237 (Harv. Univ., Harv. Inst.
of Econ. Research. 1972).
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and have commenced the requisite studies. But the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare would have better fulfilled its respon-
sibilities if it had presented to Congress an analysis and evaluation of
the existing tax expenditure programs for health care at the same
time it was urging changes in the direct expenditure programs.
While there are thus some examples here and there of involve-
ment in tax expenditures analysis by non-tax executive agencies of the
Government, it unfortunately remains true that such analysis has not
become an accepted part of the responsibilities of executive depart-
ments other than the Treasury and the Office of Management and
Budget. The Treasury cannot and should not employ staffs of lawyers
and economists who are experts on non-tax measures ranging from
welfare to housing to pollution control to health care and so on
through the entire list of areas of government responsibility to which
tax expenditures are now addressed. The various non-tax Executive
Departments must undertake systematic analyses of the tax expendi-
ture provisions that affect their respective areas of responsibility if
they and Congress are to understand the full impact of total govern-
ment financial effort in a given sector of our economic or social life.
Moreover, the Treasury and especially the Office of Management and
Budget should be more active in prodding those Departments in that
direction.
C. Public Interest Groups
After the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, a new
phenomenon arose that has increasingly influenced the tax legislative
process—the public interest tax groups. Until 1970, those who did not
have vested interests in the various tax expenditure provisions simply
were not represented in the tax legislative process except to the extent
the Treasury undertook to fulfill this function. For example, during
the three weeks in 1969 in which the Senate Finance Committee was
in executive session on the Tax Reform Bill, the hall outside the
Committee Room was virtually impassable as lobbyists for the various
tax expenditure provisions followed and attempted to influence the
Committee deliberations. In' this throng there were no representatives
of those who would benefit from repeal or restriction of the tax ex-
penditures. Indeed, the only day the Senate Committee corridor was
empty was that on which the Committee took up non-tax expenditure
provisions—the personal exemption, the minimum standard deduc-
tion and rate changes for low income taxpayers.'"
This situation has changed, however, with the advent of a few
public interest groups, notably the Tax Research Reform
in Professor McDaniel was, at the time of the events described, a legislative aide
To Senator Albert Gore, then a member of the Senate Finance Committee.
722
TAX EXPENDITURES
Group' 50 —whose primary concern is the federal tax system—and
with increasing activity by the AFL-CIO. As these groups have de-
veloped in strength and expertise, their attention has focused to a
significant degree on tax expenditures."'
While the use by public interest tax groups of the tax expendi-
ture concept is encouraging, it is clear that other public interest
groups have not yet realized the significance of tax expenditure pro-
grams in their areas of concern. For example, consumer groups in
various states have in recent years become increasingly involved in
rate-making proceedings by public utilities. In a number of instances
these groups have effectively represented consumer interests to pre-
vent or moderate proposed rate increases. But these consumer groups
appear to be unaware that their efforts have been somewhat undercut
by the public utilities in the United States Congress. In 1969 and
again in 1975, Congress considered accelerated depreciation and the
investment credit for public utilities. In each case, when these tax ex-
penditures were made available to the utilities, a provision was added
that prevented rate-making bodies from permitting or requiring that
the benefits of the tax expenditures be passed on to consumers in the
form of lower gas, electric, or telephone rates.'" In effect, the utilities
obtained from taxpayers, generally through tax expenditures, what
they could not get from consumers through higher rates. Yet con-
sumer groups were never involved in the congressional deliberations
on these matters which would appear to have a direct impact on their
work.
There are other examples of the concern that non-tax public in-
terest groups should have with respect to tax expenditure provisions.
Those groups interested in control of local property tax rates ought to
take a considerable interest in the exemption provided by section
103(c) of the Internal Revenue Code for interest paid on industrial
development bonds, especially pollution control bonds, as there is
considerable evidence that this federal tax expenditure actually helps
ISO The Tax Research Reform Group is a part of Ralph Nader's operations and is
headed by Robert Brandon. It also publishes PEOPLE ANI) TAXES. Another group which
supplies useful information in this area is Tax Advocates and Analysists, which pub-
lishes TAX NOTES.
151 See also the 'fax Justice Act of 1975, H.R. 10086, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975),
developed by the National Committee for Tax Justice, an umbrella organization for a
dozen local citizens' tax reform groups around the country. This measure deals almost
entirely with the elimination or modification of tax expenditures. A colloquy on the Act
appears at 121 CoNG. REC. H. 10223-36 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1975).
'" The result was achieved by the "normalization" requirement in INT. REV. CODE OF
1954,111670 ) as to accelerated depreciation, and' in § 46(e) as to the investment credit. The
benefits of the investment credit may be "flowed-through" to consumers by a utility if it
accounts for the credit in this fashion both for book accounting and tax accounting pur-
poses. Section 101(c) of the Revenue Act of 1971 insures, however, that "flow-through" is
purely at the option of the utility—:it cannot be required to adopt this method.
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drive up local property taxes.' 53 Groups interested in local rent con-
trol should be knowledgeable about the extent to which landlords re-
ceive federal financial aid through the investment credit, accelerated
depreciation, and expensing of construction interest and taxes, so that
tenants could be in a position to bargain for lower rents as the results
of these federal subsidies. Environmental groups should certainly un-
derstand the scope and effects of tax subsidies, some of which are de-
signed to encourage pollution control and others of which may have
the effect of inducing wastage of our natural resources.'"
The point to be made is that public interest groups have a vital
stake in tax expenditures even if their concern is not with federal in-
come taxation as such. These groups need to understand that they
must monitor the work of the House Ways and Means Committee and
the Senate Finance Committee as closely as they do federal and state
legislative and administrative bodies that are directly responsible for
their particular areas of interest. Development of tax expenditure ex-
pertise by these non-tax public interest groups will surely aid in the
understanding of the proper scope for the use of tax expenditure
programs.
VI 1 I. TAX EXPENDITURE CONCEPT—OTHER TAXES
The above discussion has been in terms of an income tax. This is
because the tax expenditure concept in the United States was de-
veloped in relation to that tax. This was natural, given the continuing
discussion relating to income tax incentives and their widespread use.
But it would seem that the tax expenditure concept is equally applica-
ble to any tax that has a "global" or overall reach similar to that of the
income tax. The normative income tax is designed to encompass all
items of "income." It is this global reach that characterizes the tax and
provides its essential fairness and hence, utility. A normative estate or
transfer tax would also appear to have such a global content, since it
should be designed to cover all wealth transferred by the decedent or
donor. Likewise, a normative annual wealth tax would also appear to
involve a global reach. This being so, we should be able to construct
tax expenditure lists for such taxes.' 55 In the excise field, a normative
"3 See, e.g., Peterson & Galper, Tax-Exempt Financing of Private Industry's Pollution
Control Investment, 23 PUBLIC POLICY No. I, at 81 (Winter, 1975); Surrey, Federal Income
Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Govern-
mental Assistance, 84 HAM'. L. REV. 352, 371-80 (1970).
" 4 See KNEES[. & SCHULTZE. supra note 113; McDaniel & Kaplinsky, The Use of the
Federal Income Tax System to Combat Air and Water Pollution: A Case Study in Tax Expendi-
tures, 12 B.C. IND. Com . L. REv. 351 (1971).
I" A preliminary tax expenditure list fo r the estate and gift taxes prepared by
the authors was set forth in the testimony of Senator Kennedy before the Senate Fi-
nance Committee in its hearings on estate and gift tax revision on May 17, 1976. A
more refined list will be presented in W. WARREN. S. SURREY, P. MCDANIEL & H.
GUTMAN, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Girr TAXATION (late 1976).
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value-added tax or other general sales tax (such as a retail sales tax or
imanufacturer's sales tax) would seem to have a sufficient global reach
or universality so that it would also be susceptible to tax expenditure
analysis. Other excise taxes, being inherently limited in scope ab initio,
are presumably not ready candidates for such analysis. A real prop-
erty tax, if intended to be comprehensive, would be a candidate.'"
On the whole, it is evident that tax expenditure analysis may be ex-
tended to a number of taxes beyond the income tax, so that this mat-
ter merits consideration and research.
CONCLUSION
Treatment of tax expenditures as the functional equivalent of
direct expenditures in the Budget Reform Act of 1974 marks a major
advance both for those concerned with budget efficiency and for
those concerned with tax equity. Movement of the tax expenditure
concept from a definitional to an operational stage should serve as a
stimulus for increased study of existing and proposed tax expendi-
tures by Congress, the Executive Branch, public interest groups and
academics. The result of these efforts can be a fairer and more ra-
tional allocation of public resources.
For a description of a tax expenditure budget for the City of New York de-
rived from property tax exemptions it affords for regional special purposes, see Benja-
min, New York City's Costly Tax Exemptions, N.Y. Times, March 28, 1976, F, at 16, col. 2.
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